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LOCAL POLICE SURVEILLANCE AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT
By Mailyn Fidler1
Police surveillance has become a problem of governance, not a
problem of procedure. The introduction and use of sophisticated
surveillance technologies, once reserved for elite central
governments, in local policing has raised questions about the
sufficiency of existing approaches. Judicial oversight—applying
standard Fourth Amendment inquiries—falls short, limited to the
facts of and parties to the case, rather than systems of
surveillance, and with judges often unaware of or unable to
access key technical details of the case. Other alternatives,
including legislative guidelines for police technology and local
police rulemaking, are lacking in other ways. This Article argues
that the proper response to use of sophisticated investigative
technologies by local police is local administrative governance
by city councils or local administrative agencies. Having an
external administrative body make rules about police technology
brings with it an ability to consider expanded concerns about
technology, timeliness, and an ability to regulate interactions
with private actors. There are reasons to be worried about this
proposal, too. But, drawing on the nascent literature about local
administrative governance, this proposal is most likely to be
1

J.D., Yale Law School, 2020. The author would like to thank Collin
Anderson, Kade Crockford, Jason Eiseman, Barry Friedman, Heather Gerken,
Ben Green, Christine Jolls, Scarlet Kim, Susan Landau, Lily Z. Liu, Asaf
Lubin, Jonathan Mayer, Edin Omanovic, Daphna Renan, Alan Rozenshtein,
David Schleicher, Kate Stith, Jonathan Zittrain, David O’Brien and the
Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society Cybersecurity paper workshop,
and the Tufts Graduate Student Symposium in Cybersecurity Policy. The
author would also like to thank the journalists who helped with this piece
(Joseph Cox, Freddy Martinez, Michael Morisy, and Sam Richards), the
Bloomington City Clerk’s Office, the Water Protectors of Standing Rock
(whose experiences navigating surveillance inspired this article).
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responsive, accountable, and effective in the local context. In
addition to offering a set of legal arguments, this paper contains
two novel descriptive contributions. First, where other papers
have focused on the legal risks of certain technologies, this paper
compiles a comprehensive look at a range of police technologies
and systematically analyzes the risks they pose both legally and
at the local level. Second, this paper offers the first
comprehensive assessment of the current efforts that localities
have made towards implementing this kind of local
administrative governance for police technology.
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INTRODUCTION
Local police now have access to surveillance tools once
reserved for elite central governments. These surveillance technologies
and their use at the local level bring new risks with them. Fourth
Amendment judicial review, an ex post liability regime that imposes
sanctions only after surveillance occurs, is insufficient as a system of
oversight over local surveillance. Local police surveillance needs to be
met with a system of ex ante governance that addresses questions
beyond police procedure. This Article argues that local administrative
governance of police surveillance is the way to achieve this goal.
The technologies local police are using are now “more
powerful than those used by superpowers during the Cold War,” a 2014
presidential report noted.2 Surveillance tools trickle down to local law
enforcement departments from the federal government and are
increasingly accessible directly on a robust private market. Many
police departments are using these powerful technologies in new ways,
too. Police are engaging in what scholars have termed “programmatic
surveillance,” which involves broader searches that rely on courtsanctioned protocols that fall short of Fourth Amendment
individualized suspicion.3 Examples of these programs include use of
facial recognition technology, checkpoints, searches of businesses for
evidence of regulatory violations, drug testing of groups, DNA
sampling of all arrestees, and use of automated license plate readers or
electronic tolling tools like EZ Pass for investigative purposes.4 Data
gathered from any of these practices can be fed into databases and
sophisticated data analytics software, increasing the utility of the data
for law enforcement.5
2

John Podesta et al., Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (May 2014).
3
Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68
STAN. L. REV. 1039 (2016).
4
Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 1727 (2014); Barry
Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90.6 NYU L. REV.
1827, 1874 (2015); Dan Glaun, Massachusetts Police Use Electronic Tolling
System to Track People in Ongoing Investigations, GOV. TECH. (Aug. 11,
2017).
5
For example, CellHawk is software that takes in raw call record details and
turns out easy-to-use analyses of that data, including maps; see Sean Curtis,
Get More Answers from Call Detail Records Using CellHawk Software,
POLICEONE (July 7, 2017) (thanks to Sam Richardson with the NStarPost for
the example); see also Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: the Case of
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Critics of judicial-only oversight of these practices, such as
Daphna Renan, have argued that courts are “hamstrung in their ability
to supervise the sprawling, interacting, and overlapping administrative
policies shaping the modern power to search.”6 Friedman and
Ponomarenko argue that these limitations render
“traditional
constraints on the sweep of criminal law enforcement largely
meaningless."7 Furthermore, courts operate at a purposefully careful
pace, but this feature means that courts have taken up to a decade to
converge on the proper applicability of Fourth Amendment protections
to law enforcement use of new technologies, leaving a legal gap.8 This
judicial caution has some benefits, but it also results in law enforcement
being able to anticipate years of warrantless application of newly
introduced devices. Moreover, the ways in which local police typically
gain access to sophisticated surveillance technology, often conditioned
on non-disclosure agreements with manufacturers and/or the FBI, also
shield the use of this technology from effective judicial oversight.
These risks are exacerbated or augmented when we move from
the federal to the local level. State courts may fare even more poorly
than federal courts in terms of expertise about or exposure to such cases
to deal adequately with these technologies. Similarly, state defense
counsel may face substantial resource constraints, reducing their ability
to bring novel legal arguments about technology to the attention of
judges. Beyond courts, the private sector may be able to exert more
pressure in local contracts to keep details of technology out of courts:
some local governments will be less sophisticated negotiating partners
than the federal government. The sheer number of local governments
available as potential customers will mean that technical training
supplied to officers, NDAs, and advertised use cases will vary much
more than at the federal level. And, in most cases, these private
contracts will be shielded from any local political oversight.9
Policing, 82.2 AM. SOC. REV. (2017); see also Craig Timberg and Ellen
Nakashima, State Photo-ID Databases Become Troves for Police, WASH.
POST (June 13, 2016); Tami Abdollah, Private Database Lets Police Skirt
License Plate Limits, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Oct. 7, 2015).
6
See Renan, supra note 3, at 1045.
7
See Friedman and Ponomarenko, supra note 4, at 1874.
8
See infra Section II(B)(3)(a) for an account of a ten-year delay in the case of
stingray devices.
9
See Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policymaking by Procurement, 91
WASH. L. REV. 1595, 1597-98 (2016). For an example of a centralized
procurement office, see the Baltimore Bureau of Procurement,
https://procurement.baltimorecity.gov/. For an example of departmental
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Similarly, federal government grant programs to localities usually
bypass local political control.10 Last, local law enforcement also deals
with a wider range of crimes than does federal law enforcement, which
means their use of these technologies disperses the technologies and
their risks more thoroughly through communities. In particular, local
law enforcement officers also serve as the typical responders to
protests, which further disperses these risks onto wide sections of the
population.
This Article’s argument for local administrative governance of
surveillance technology takes inspiration from existing, influential
scholarship on this question of police governance at the federal level
and in other non-technology contexts at the local level.11 Daphna
Renan, the author of the most relevant work examining Fourth
Amendment administrative governance at the federal level, argues that
a “[federal] administrative overseer . . . can engage in a more holistic,
granular, and data-driven Fourth Amendment interest balancing than
courts have shown a willingness to undertake.”12 Renan writes that a
federal administrative approach to Fourth Amendment issues “opens a
broader prescriptive conversation,” noting local policing in particular
deserves examination.13 I take up this prescriptive conversation and
argue that administrative governance at the local level is needed,
especially given the special risks of the context. The nationwide
appetite for this kind of local governance has only grown in recent
years. Michael Brown’s killing in 2014 and the resulting surveillance
of protesters focused attention on reform of local police governance in
a serious way. Local reform of police has only taken on increased
urgency and political plausibility in wake of protests responding to
procurement, see Bismarck, North Dakota,
https://www.bismarcknd.gov/DocumentCenter/View/4478/Handgun-RFP1.
10
Crump, supra note 9, at 1600, 1656.
11
See generally Renan, supra note 3; see also Jonathan Mayer, Government
Hacking, 127 YALE L.J. 570 (2018); Slobogin, supra note 4; see also Kenneth
Culp Davis’ work on administrative governance of police, including
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
188 (1969) and Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the
Police, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 703 (1974); Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974); Donald A. Dripps,
‘Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment’ Forty Years Later: Towards the
Realization of an Inclusive Regulatory Model, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1885
(2016); Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659,
690 (1972).
12
See Renan, supra note 3, at 1045.
13
See Renan, supra note 3, at 1046 n.24.
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George Floyd’s 2020 killing. Governance of local police surveillance
is an important part of this broader reform discussion.
Administrative governance looks different at the local level
than at the federal level—and will vary widely between differently
structured local governments. This Article focuses on three defining
features to capture what administrative governance looks like at the
local level. Practically, administrative governance will happen through
the blended legislative-executive functions of city councils or through
separate appointed bodies. In terms of defining features, first, an
administrative body has “institutional remove from [the] front-line
actors” it regulates.14 Second, the body has the ability to state the rules
by which decisions will be made and the further ability to make those
specific decisions at distinct points in time. Last, the predominant,
although not exclusive, mode of administrative decision-making is ex
ante, rather than ex post. These features allow administrative governors
to take a systemic view of issues, one that can consider social and
policy concerns, not one scoped to the rights or circumstances of an
individual.15 In addition, these aspects impart the benefits of speed and
adaptability. In the context of local police surveillance technology,
these advantages translate to an ability to govern in a technologically
neutral manner,16 place finer-grained controls on investigative powers,
reach police interactions with private parties (not just with defendants),
and shift a regulatory regime in response to new information.
Importantly, this kind of administrative governance approach
to the Fourth Amendment would still rely on the final judgment and
review of courts. But, in this context, courts would review police action
that would have been first taken pursuant to a transparent and
accountable administrative process, acting within the bounds of
legislated powers.17 Courts could also potentially review the
administrative procedures themselves.18 Such an approach incorporates
the best of judicial expertise, expert knowledge, and democratic
accountability.
The first Part of this Article compiles details about the use of
two categories of police surveillance technology and systematically
14

See Renan, supra note 3, at 1045; see also Maria Ponomarenko, Rethinking
Police Rulemaking, 114 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2019).
15
See Renan, supra note 3, at 1051 (discussing transactional versus
programmatic regulation of surveillance).
16
For a general discussion and critique of technology-neutral regulation, see
Brad Greenberg, Rethinking Technological Neutrality, 100 MINN. L. REV.
1495 (2016).
17
See Renan, supra note 3, at 1075.
18
See infra section III(D).
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analyzes the legal risks they pose, especially at the local level. Whereas
most other papers in this area focus on one specific technology’s risk,
this synthetic treatment is important because it highlights the risks that
surveillance technologies in general (rather than one specific tool)
present in a local context governed only by courts. The second Part of
this Article then presents the case for administrative governance of
police surveillance technology at the local level and argues against
alternatives. The Article closes with the first comprehensive
assessment of current efforts localities have made towards
implementing this kind of local administrative governance for police
technology. This analysis reveals early signs of promise that local
administrative governance of surveillance technologies can help ensure
Justice Brandeis’ hope “that the ‘progress of science’ does not erode
Fourth Amendment protections.”19
I.

LEGAL & LOCAL CHALLENGES OF SURVEILLANCE
TECHNOLOGY

A. Background
In 2014, the Supreme Court held in Riley v. California that a
warrantless search of a cellphone and its contents incident to arrest was
unconstitutional.20 The Supreme Court’s decision in Riley was, to quote
Orin Kerr, “a big deal.”21 Kerr argues that “Riley can be fairly read as
saying that computers are a game-changer” and as a signal that the
Supreme Court endorses “treating computer searches differently than
physical searches.”22
The devices addressed in this article all enable surveillance of
cell phones, essentially mini-computers, tools which the Supreme
Court has recognized as fundamentally sensitive.23 These technologies
share a set of distinct features, including the ability to collect multiple
types of data from devices in the possession of surveillance targets,
making them a distinct category that can be analyzed together. Other
19

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210 (2018) (quoting Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting)).
20
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2474 (2014).
21
Orin Kerr, The Significance of Riley, THE WASH. POST (June 25, 2014,
8:56 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/06/25/the-significance-of-riley/.
22
Id.
23
See Riley supra note 20, at Ct.2494-95 (2014) (“Modern cell phones are not
just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may
reveal, they hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”).

490

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 36

technologies, such as facial recognition and predictive policing
technologies, have also “trickled down” from federal use.24 This
Article confines its analysis to cell-phone related technologies,
however, for three reasons: first, for brevity, and second, because the
Supreme Court has helpfully recognized cell phones as fundamentally
different and sensitive from other past kinds of technology, providing
a good legal basis for grouping them.25 Third, it does so for a
conceptual reason: other technologies, such as facial recognition and
predictive policing, do not rely on access or interference with devices
owned by citizens and, as such, do not involve questions of property,
an important legal distinction.
The following section introduces two technologies used for cellphone surveillance: stingray devices and mobile forensics devices.
Each subsection in this Part describes how the technology works and
documents the technology’s movement from federal to local law
enforcement. In addition, each section surveys the legal issues that
these technologies raise, specifically noting where state and local use
exacerbates or complicates these legal issues.26 Specifically, these
sections highlight how existing court-centric Fourth Amendment
oversight has fallen short.
Of these technologies, stingray devices have diffused through the
local and state law enforcement scene most thoroughly. As such, they
are the least novel technology analyzed, but exploring stingray devices
provides a complete case study of trickle-down technology and the
insufficiencies of a standard, court-driven approach to accompanying
privacy challenges. For the sake of brevity and clarity, this paper refers
to all instances of this technology as “stingray devices,” regardless of
24

Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How the Police Use Facial Recognition, and
Where it Falls Short, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2020); City of Bridgeport
Predictive Policing Technology and Police Radio Acquisition, BYRNE-JAG
AWARD 2016-DJ-BX-0647, 2016.
25
See Riley supra note 20, at Ct.2494-95 (2014).
26
For a more in-depth look at these issues as identified at the federal level,
see, e.g., Mayer, supra note 11; see also Susan W. Brenner, Fourth
Amendment Future: Remote Computer Searches and the Use of Virtual Force,
81 MISS. L.J. 1229, 1229-31 (2012); see also Gus Hosein and Caroline Wilson
Palow, Modern Safeguards for Modern Surveillance: An Analysis of
Innovations in Communications Surveillance Techniques, 74 OHIO ST. L.J.
1071, 1093-97 (2013). But see Steven M. Bellovin et. al., Lawful Hacking:
Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wiretapping on the Internet, 12 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 (2014) (arguing that lawful hacking is “on
balance, preferable to adding more complexity and insecurity to online
systems.”).
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their actual brand names (alternative brand names to the Stingray brand
include Triggerfish or KingFish, or the generic term is cell-site
simulators/IMSI catchers).
Technology rapidly changes. As surveillance reporter Joseph Cox
writes, “there’s always a new player in the law enforcement hacking
industry.”27Although the specifics of the technologies used by local law
enforcement may change going forward, general patterns emerge in
certain areas from a study of a subset of specific tools. These patterns
include the transfer from federal to local use, legal questions common
across technologies, and similar judicial responses to new
technologies. These common aspects can be used to build an analysis
of needed governance mechanisms.
The local context adds to the legal risk these tools raise. Even at
the federal level, there has been widespread confusion about the legal
frameworks for these tools. There, only a few centrally coordinated
agencies and federal courts are relevant decisionmakers. With dozens
of state agencies and courts now joining the interpretation game, the
legal landscape will grow even murkier. As the Introduction noted,
expertise of judges and counsel, increased bargaining power of the
private sector, the lack of political oversight, and the range of crimes
investigated by local police add specific local concerns to the legal
worries.
B. Stingray Devices
1. Stingray Basics
As protesters in Chicago gathered in the wake of the controversy
surrounding Michael Brown’s 2014 death in Ferguson, Chicago police
seemed to possess detailed knowledge of local organizer Kristiana Rae
Colón’s phone.28 A watchdog group recorded police discussing Colón:
“She’s been on her phone a lot . . . you guys picking up any information
where they’re going, possibly,” with a second officer responding,
“Yeah, we’re keeping an eye on it,” and “we’ll let you know if we hear

27

Joseph Cox, Government Malware Company ‘Grey Heron’ Advertises
Signal, Telegram Spyware, MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 7, 2018, 8:05 AM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bj54kw/grey-heron-new-spywarebrochure-hacking-team.
28
Fruzsina Eördögh, Evidence of ‘Stingray’ Phone Surveillance by Police
Mounts in Chicago, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 22, 2014),
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2014/1222/Evidence-ofstingray-phone-surveillance-by-police-mounts-in-Chicago.

492

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 36

anything.”29 Based on the technical details, the Chicago police likely
had a stingray device located near the protesters, sending data to remote
officers for analysis. We do not know for sure, because here, as
elsewhere, local police often use vague terms to describe their use of
such technologies. For instance, Florida police have often referred to
stingray device use with the euphemistic “electronic surveillance
measures,”30 also frequently referring to the devices as “confidential
intelligence.”31 Another Florida court document merely stated that an
investigator “arrived and determined” the location of a tracked phone,
without any further detail.32
As of November 2018, at least 75 local and state agencies in 27
states have cell-site simulator technologies, colloquially known by a
popular brand name—Stingrays.33 Stingray devices mimic the normal
cell towers that enable everyday use of mobile phones, allowing data
to pass through a monitored channel rather than through the typical
proprietary cell towers. 34 SIM cards in phones use a number called the
“International Mobile Subscriber Identity” (IMSI) to interface with cell
phone towers. These numbers are unique to each SIM card. 35 When a
phone connects to a spoofed cell tower (the stingray device), the phone
will reveal this IMSI number to the stingray device.36 Police can use
that number to identify the phone’s owner.37
In addition to identifying a phone, stingray devices can track the
location of a particular phone by measuring the strength of its signal
over time using a technique called trilateration.38 To do so, the stingray
29

CPD possible Stingray use at #BrownFriday protest, CLYP (2014),
clyp.it/sv23cozu.
30
Tallahassee Police Dep’t Incident Report, Case Report No. 00-08-013508
(Apr. 26, 2008) (on file with the ACLU).
31
Tallahassee Police Dep’t Incident Report, Case Report No. 00-08-037256
(Dec. 01, 2008) (on file with the ACLU).
32
Tallahassee Police Dep’t Incident Report, Case Report No. 00-11-031679
(Nov. 17, 2011) (on file with the ACLU).
33
Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them? ACLU
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillancetechnologies/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them (last updated Nov.
2018) [hereinafter ACLU].
34
See IMSI Catchers, PRIVACY INT’L (Aug. 6, 2018),
https://www.privacyinternational.org/explainer/2222/imsi-catchers.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Yomna N, Gotta Catch ‘Em All: Understanding How IMSI-Catchers
Exploit Cell Networks, EFF (June 28, 2019).
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device must be in proximity to those under surveillance (the data can
be sent elsewhere for remote analysis, as with the Colón example
above).39 Given that they mimic cell towers, stingray devices collect
data about all phones within range, even if the police are only interested
in select phones.40 Some stingray devices apparently have the technical
capabilities to collect content information as well as identifying
numbers and location, although DOJ policy as of 2015 requires federal
stingray devices to be configured so this capability is not in use.41
2. Use Statistics
As of November 2018, fourteen federal agencies had stingray
devices, which have been used by the federal government since at least
1995.42 Since 1995, local and state agencies have been able to borrow
the equipment from the FBI for their investigations in “exceptional
circumstances.”43 It was not until the mid-2000s that state and local
forces began acquiring their own equipment, often with federal grant
money as part of anti-terrorism efforts.

39

Id.
Id.
41
See Department of Justice Policy Guidance: Use of Cell-Site Simulator
Technology, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 2 (Sep. 3, 2015) (“[C]ell-site simulators
used by the Department must be configured as pen registers, and may not be
used to collect the contents of any communication, in accordance with 18
U.S.C. § 3127(3). This includes any data contained on the phone itself: the
simulator does not remotely capture emails, texts, contact lists, images or any
other data from the phone. In addition, Department cell-site simulators do not
provide subscriber account information (for example, an account holder’s
name, address, or telephone number).”).
42
Federal agencies possessing Stingrays as of November 2018: FBI, DEA,
NSA, Secret Service, U.S. Marshals, ICE, ATF, IRS, the Army, Navy, Marine
Corps, National Guard, CBP, and U.S. Special Operations Command. See
ACLU, supra note 33; see also Ryan Gallagher, FBI Files Unlock History
Behind Clandestine Cellphone Tracking Tool, SLATE (Feb. 15, 2013, 2:34
PM), https://slate.com/technology/2013/02/stingray-imsi-catcher-fbi-filesunlock-history-behind-cellphone-tracking-tool.html (The brand name
“Stingray” first came on the market in 2001) [hereinafter Gallagher I]. See
also Ryan Gallagher, Meet the machines that steal your phone’s data, ARS
TECHNICA (Sep. 25, 2013, 10:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2013/09/meet-the-machines-that-steal-your-phones-data/ [hereinafter
Gallagher II].
43
Gallagher I, supra note 42; see also FBI FOIA Release No. 1182490-000,
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 7, 2013), https://epic.org/foia/fbi/stingray/FBI-FOIARelease-02222013-OCR.pdf.
40
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As stated above, at least 75 local and state agencies in 27 states
have cell-site simulator technologies as of November 2018.44 The
earliest record I have found of local acquisition of stingray devices is
for the Miami police in 2003.45 Michigan State Police began using
stingray devices by at least 2006.46 The funding came exclusively from
the federal government through the Homeland Security Grant
Program.47 Purchase documents note:
[T]he ability to track the location of a mobile phone in real time
as well as collecting signaling information is vital to the war on
terrorism. This equipment will allow the State to track the
physical location of a suspected terrorist who is using wireless
communications as part of their operations.48
Internal documents obtained in 2015 show that the devices have
not been, in fact, used for terrorism investigations, but rather to
investigate a range of more standard crimes including homicide, fraud,
and burglary.49
The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) acquired Stingray
technology in 2004 through a federal government grant program, the
Fiscal Year 2004 Homeland Security Grant Program.50 In 2005, the city
council file authorizing the purchase states that, “[i]n response to the
recent bombings in London . . . [the LAPD] has responded with a
substantial increase in terrorism prevention . . . [and] the LAPD is
requesting the expedited purchase” of a stingray device-like
technology called a Digital Receiver Technology (DRT).51

44

ACLU, supra note 33.
Gallagher II, supra note 42.
46
Nathan Freed Wessler, Police Citing ‘Terrorism’ to Buy Stingrays Used
Only for Ordinary Crimes, ACLU (Oct. 23, 2015, 9:00 AM).
47
See Mich. Dept. of State Police, FOIA Response (to August 10, 2015 Appeal
by Daniel S. Korobkin (on file with the ACLU) [hereinafter Michigan
Response]; see also City of Tacoma, Responses to June 20, 2014 FOIA
Request.
48
Michigan Response, supra note 47, at 11.
49
Joel Kurth, Michigan State Police Using Secret Cell Tracking Devices
Since ’06, Documents Show, DETROIT NEWS (Oct. 22, 2015, 11:32 PM),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/10/22/stingra
y/74438668/ (last updated Oct. 23, 2015). See also Crump, supra note 9, at
1598.
50
Office of the City Clerk, City of Los Angeles, Council File 04-2499-S2
(Aug. 24, 2005).
51
Id.
45
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3. Stingray Device Litigation History: What Legal
Authorization is Required?
One of the central questions surrounding stingray devices is what
legal authorization police must obtain before using it. The following
section sets out the history of litigation over this question in federal
courts. Despite this Article’s focus on the local and state context, these
issues were first litigated and better documented in federal court than
in state court. Nonetheless, this history essentially parallels the issues
that state courts subsequently had to face.
At a high level, the history of oversight for stingray devices
essentially alternates between policy and judicial requirements. First,
the federal government had a policy of not obtaining even a court order
for stingray device use. Federal courts affirmed this policy. As stingray
devices began to be used for location tracking, not just identifying
telephone numbers, courts pushed back and required heightened
standards to obtain legal authorization. Still, whether law enforcement
had to obtain a warrant for such use was not definitively settled in court.
Subsequently, the federal government implemented a policy of
requiring warrants for stingray use; it was only then that many state
courts followed suit in legally requiring warrants. That said, only lower
federal courts and some state supreme courts have ruled that searches
using stingray devices require warrants as a legal matter; whether
warrants are required for stingrays is still technically legally unsettled
after more than a decade.
This legal history highlights two particularly important themes in
assessing how administrative governance can supplement judicial
oversight of new search tools. First, this history highlights a pervasive
lack of transparency on the part of the government with not only the
public but also with courts. Administrative governance offers the
ability to require information disclosure from law enforcement in more
ways than the Fourth Amendment does.52 Specifically, defense counsel
and the public were largely unaware of stingray device use until 2010;
up to that point, law enforcement typically filed run-of-the-mill trap
and trace pen register applications to use stingray devices, which
essentially hid the change in technology.53 Second, the litigation
history shows the importance of the interaction between administrative
agencies and the judicial branch in achieving up-to-date governance of

52

United States v. Rigmaiden, No. 08-cr-00814-DGC 982, 983 (D. Ariz. Jan.
4, 2012).
53
Id. at 995.
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surveillance technologies. Administrative governance, important in its
own right, can also prompt change in the judicial branch.
Table 1: Types of Legal Authorization for Seeking Data54
(Ordered from most stringent to least stringent)

a. No Authorization Required Era, 1995-2005
Early Department of Justice policy on stingray devices, first
publicly documented in 1997, stated that neither the Fourth
Amendment nor relevant statutes required judicial authorization for
using stingray devices to gather non-content data.55 The earliest
documentable case featuring a stingray device involved federal officers
seeking what was essentially a Pen/Trap order “out of an abundance of
caution,” despite contending no order was legally necessary.56 The
officer’s application for a court order essentially sought to obtain a
legally binding court ruling to that effect.
54

This is adapted from Magistrate Judge Smith’s opinion In re Pen Register
& Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747
(S.D. Tex. 2005). As a note, the dates are rough, because they correspond to
public availability of policies; policy changes may actually have occurred
earlier.
55
See Executive Office for United States Attorneys, Electronic Investigative
Techniques, 45.5 USA BULLETIN 1, 13-15 (1997). See also Stephanie Pell and
Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More Than a Pen Register, and Less Than a
Wiretap, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 134, 158 (2016).
56
In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for an Order
Authorizing the Use of a Cellular Tel. Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197, 200
(C.D. Cal. 1995). Regarding the status of this case as the “first,” court
documents do not use standard terminology to refer to stingray devices,
meaning large-scale searches for case literature can be limited by authors’
term selection; cases may exist earlier than 1995. For papers tracing the history
of legal cases relating to stingray devices, see Brian L. Owsley, Triggerfish,
StingRays, and Fourth Amendment Fishing Expeditions, 66 HASTINGS L.J.
183 (2014); see also Craig Curtis et al., Using Technology the Founders Never
Dreamed of: Cell Phones as Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment, 4
U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 61 (2014). See also Pell and Soghoian, supra note 55.
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It worked. The court initially rejected the application and asked
for more detail from the government, including “who would operate
the analyzer, under what circumstances, and how its use would be
limited to detecting cellular phones used by the subjects of the . . .
investigation.”57 But, upon receiving clarifications, the court
determined that a court order was not required to use such a device to
collect phone numbers in the manner described.58 That said, the court
included warning language that such devices, used in more invasive
ways, might require legal authorization.59 The court’s worries proved
prescient, as discussed below.
b. Courts Ratchet Up to Statutory Protections,
2005-2010
By 2005, federal policy changed dramatically, adopting the
position that the Pen/Trap statute, as updated by the 2001 PATRIOT
Act, applied to stingray device use.60 Still, this positive policy change
correlated with an increase in stingray device use. By the early to mid2000s, law enforcement agents had more widely begun to use stingrays
to identify location information in addition to phone numbers.61 Federal
agents sought legal authorization for prospective location data—
obtained via stingray devices or otherwise—in one of two ways, both
of which required meeting a “specific and articulable facts” standard.62
First, they argued that legal authorization could be obtained through
the Stored Communications Act (SCA); this view characterized
location information as records held by a third-party provider.63
Second, federal agents argued that the Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA
together provided statutory authority for obtaining prospective location
data, which became known as the “hybrid theory.”64
To their credit, courts generally did not accept either version of
this argument.65 Most courts responded to these arguments by requiring

57

In the Matter of the United States, supra note 56, at 198.
Id. at 199.
59
Id. at 201-02.
60
Electronic Surveillance Unit, Electronic Surveillance Manual: Procedures
and Case Law Forms, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1, 41 (2005).
61
Reeve Wood, The Prolonged Arm of the Law: Fourth Amendment
Principles, the Maynard Decision, and the Need for a New Warrant for
Electronic Tracking, 64 ME. L. REV. 285, 311 (2011).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 312.
58
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the government to meet a probable cause standard to obtain prospective
location information.66 Still, some courts accepted arguments based on
the “hybrid theory,” and variation in legal standards emerged between
courts.67 In addition, despite increased judicial scrutiny, all of these
debates occurred essentially behind the scenes between the government
applicants and courts. Litigant challenges, and accompanying public
scrutiny, did not enter the picture until 2010.68
c. Public Legal Battles over Warrant Status,
2010-2015
Around 2010, a new wave of legal challenges began.69 Defendants
discovered, and subsequently challenged, use of stingray devices in
their criminal cases. Defendants generally argued that warrants, and
highly specific ones at that, were required to use stingray devices. The
2010-2013 United States v. Rigmaiden litigation is considered the case
that made debate over the correct legal authorization for stingray device
use public. In this case, a determined pro se litigant uncovered that
federal agents had used stingray devices to apprehend him. While in
prison on tax fraud charges, Rigmaiden mulled over how the police
possibly could have tracked him down; he had been using a tax fraud
scheme to fund a largely off-the-grid life.70 His only weak link, he
realized, was the cellular AirCard he used to connect to the Internet to
file the fraudulent tax returns.71 What began as a hunch ([the
authorities] sent “rays into my living room”) turned into thousands of
hours of jailhouse research and tens of thousands of pages of document

66

Id. at 311-12 (noting that, as of April 2009, of the 28 reported decisions on
prospective CSLI, 20 decisions found that probable cause was required to
obtain a court order releasing the information).
67
Id. at 312-13. See In the Matter of the Application of the U.S. States for an
Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Peen Register and Trap
and Trace Device; and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Information
and/or Cell Site Information, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 679-81 (W.D. La. 2006)
[hereinafter Hornsby I].
68
See Rigmaiden litigation, infra notes 69-76.
69
See United States v. Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982, 995 (D. Ariz. 2012)
[hereinafter Rigmaiden I]. United States v. Rigmaiden (Rigmaiden), No. CR
08-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at *6 (D. Ariz. 2013) [hereinafter
Rigmaiden II].
70
Cale Guthrie Weissman, How an Obsessive Recluse Blew the Lid off the
Secret Technology Authorities Use to Spy on People’s Cellphones, BUSINESS
INSIDER (June 19, 2015, 2:04 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/howdaniel-rigmaiden-discovered-stingray-spying-technology-2015-6.
71
Id.
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review.72 He discovered references in court documents to new
“investigative techniques” associated with cell phone towers.73 He then
contacted the ACLU, which helped his legal challenge move forward.74
Rigmaiden’s case is most notable for bringing public and litigant
awareness to the use of stingrays by law enforcement. Rigmaiden lost
his Fourth Amendment challenge when the court concluded that the
government’s legal process to obtain Rigmaiden’s location information
was sufficient.75 Subsequent defendant challenges ended similarly,
with courts concluding that stingray devices could be used in keeping
with statutory (not warrant) requirements, declining to rule on Fourth
Amendment grounds, and allowing evidence to appear at trial on the
basis of the good faith exception.76
But two facets of the Rigmaiden case are important for this
Article, demonstrating key shortcomings of judicial Fourth
Amendment oversight that could be mitigated through administrative
governance. First, a subsequent FOIA investigation raised doubts about
the forthrightness of the government’s representations in court during
the Rigmaiden litigation.77 Emails obtained through FOIA, together
with the text of the order in question, “suggest agents obtained
authorization to use a pen register without indicating they also planned
to use a Stingray . . . [and at some point] the government attempted to
72

Id.; see Manoush Zomorodi, When your Conspiracy Theory is True,
WNYC STUDIOS (June 18, 2015),
https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/notetoself/episodes/stingrayconspiracy-theory-daniel-rigmaiden-radiolab (timestamp 8:15).
73
Weissman, supra note 70; see LINDA LYE, STINGRAYS: THE MOST COMMON
SURVEILLANCE TOOL THE GOVERNMENT WON’T TELL YOU ABOUT, A GUIDE
FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS ACLU FROM THE ACLU OF NORTHERN
CALIFORNIA 39 (2014) Exhibit (“During the course of this investigation and
conferring with TSD agents with the FBI and USPIS, we determined that
doing a normal ‘Trap and Trace’ on the aircard would suffice. [redacted]
Essentially we would ping the number associated to the card instead of
collecting data from the aircard’s connection . . . On 7/16/08, we were
informed that they were able to track a signal and were using a ‘Stingray’ to
pinpoint the location of the aircard.”).
74
Rigmaiden first sought discovery of related materials, but the court denied
his discovery requests on the grounds of law enforcement privilege. See
Rigmaiden I, supra note 69, at 995. See also Weissman, supra note 70.
75
Rigmaiden I, supra note 69, at 995.
76
See, e.g., United States v. Espudo, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031 (S.D. Cal.
(2013). See also State v. Tate, 849 N.W.2d 798, 805 (Wis. 2014).
77
Hanni Fakhoury, When a Secretive Stingray Cell Phone Tracking
“Warrant” Isn’t a Warrant, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 28, 2013),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/03/when-stingray-warrant-isnt-warrant.
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transform that order into a warrant that authorized the use of a
Stingray.”78 These doubts about law enforcement representations about
technology in court reinforce the concerns about government
transparency in Fourth Amendment judicial proceedings discussed in
subsection 3(b) below.
Second, the Rigmaiden case underscores an aspect of Fourth
Amendment law that makes judicial scrutiny of novel investigative
tools difficult. The court rested its determination of the sufficiency of
legal process on the basis that “there is no legal requirement that a
search warrant specify the precise manner in which the search is to be
executed,”79 a conclusion well-grounded in Supreme Court
precedent.80 With this body of precedent, courts, acting alone, could
find it difficult to force the transparency needed from government
agents to allow accurate judicial scrutiny of new search tools and
techniques.81
In 2012, a magistrate judge highlighted the obfuscation of
technical details of new surveillance technologies in a now-famous
opinion, refusing to grant the government’s application for an pen/trap
order for stingray use.82 In this case, the government sought to use a
stingray device to identify the phone number of a new phone that a
known subject had begun using.83 The government sought
authorization under the Pen/Trap statute and the SCA, which it
represented was the “standard application model and proposed order
approved by [DOJ].”84 But it was only during the actual ex parte
hearing for the case that a law enforcement agent specified that a
stingray device would be used in the investigation.85
This revelation informed Magistrate Judge Owsley’s decision to
deny the application. He pointed to concerns about lack of specifics
78

Id.; see also Lynda Lye, DOJ Emails Show Feds Were Less Than
“Explicit” With Judges on Cell Phone Tracking Tool, AM. C.L. UNION (Mar.
27, 2013, 11:06 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacyand-surveillance/doj-emails-show-feds-were-less-explicit-judges-cell.
79
Rigmaiden II, supra note 69, at *16.
80
See Dalia v. United States, 99 S. Ct. 1682, 1684 (1979). See also United
States v. Grubbs, 126 S. Ct. 1494, 1501 (2006).
81
But see In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for
an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and
Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 749 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
82
Id. at 752.
83
Pell and Soghoian, supra note 55, at 161.
84
In the Matter of the Application of the United States, supra note 81, at 74849.
85
Id. at 748.
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about how many locations the device would be used in, the duration of
the surveillance, and lack of data minimization procedures for
incidental data picked up from other phones.86 He concluded that the
government had not successfully provided support that the pen register
statute was the appropriate legal authorization for stingray
equipment.87 In a later speech about this decision, Judge Owsley
criticized the masking of technical details in orders:
What they do is present an application that looks
essentially like a pen register application . . . [s]o any
magistrate judge that is typically looking at a lot of pen
register applications and not paying a lot of attention
to the details may be signing an application that is
authorizing a Stingray.88
Indeed, further research through FOIA requests has uncovered
additional cases involving stingray devices where the applications for
court orders did not include this degree of specificity.89 In the instant
2012 case, Judge Owsley denied the request and called for more details
in future applications.90
d. State Law Enforcement Generally Did Not
Seek Warrants
The above discussion dealt with federal cases. At the local level,
law enforcement generally seems not to have sought warrants for
stingray device use. Details are sparse, but one set of court documents
from Tallahassee indicates that police used stingray devices 200 times
between the spring of 2007 and August of 2010 and that they did not
have a policy of seeking a warrant to use the device.91 In addition, they
did have a policy of trying to keep use of the device out of legal
documents generally.92 This held true even for location tracking: in a
particular 2008 case, police used a stingray device to track an allegedly
stolen phone to and then within an apartment building, entered the
86

Id. at 749.
Id. at 752.
88
Ryan Gallagher, Feds Accused of Hiding Information from Judges About
Covert Cellphone Tracking Tool, SLATE (Mar. 28, 2013, 12:09 PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2013/03/stingray-surveillance-technology-usedwithout-proper-approval-report.html.
89
Pell and Soghoian, supra note 55, at 163.
90
In the Matter of the Application of the United States, supra note 81.
91
Def.’s Motion to Suppress, Florida v. Thomas, No. 2008-CF-3350A 1, 26
(2010).
92
Id. at 26-27.
87
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apartment, and arrested the holder of the phone, all apparently without
a warrant.93 Similarly, public records requests to the LAPD reveal that
the police relied on statutory grounds, not warrant procedures, to
authorize stingray device use as of 2012.94
The first state case that appears in legal databases as explicitly
dealing with a stingray device is State v. Tate, a 2014 case from the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.95 This court held that probable cause was
the appropriate standard for stingray device authorization and that it
was met. This is a laudable and rare decision; generally, explicit
judicial pushback at the state level did not come until a later
administrative—not judicial—change at the federal level.
e. Federal Policy Change Ripple Effect, 2015Present
In 2015, the DOJ issued a policy guidance document stating that
federal law enforcement agencies “must now obtain a search warrant
supported by probable cause and issued pursuant to Rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure” (emphasis added) for both
location-tracking and phone-number identifying uses.96 In addition, the
policy required the kind of technical and use specificity in the warrant
application for which Magistrate Judge Owsley and others had called.97
The DOJ had come under substantial pressure in the wake of
allegations of surveillance of protesters reacting to a series of police
killings of black citizens. The DOJ document clearly stated that this
93

Id. at 25 (Court documents state that police determined they did not need a
search warrant to enter the apartment, because they achieved consent to enter.
That is hard to square from descriptions of the encounter.). See Kate Klonick,
Stingrays: Not Just for the Feds!, SLATE (Nov. 10, 2014, 9:52 AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2014/11/stingrays-imsi-catchers-how-local-lawenforcement-uses-an-invasive-surveillance-tool.html.
94
Owsley, supra note 56, at 217-18.
95
State v. Tate, supra note 76, at 812-13. See infra note 102 for search
methodology. Given the lack of transparency in many stingray device cases,
searches for cases dealing explicitly with these devices may miss earlier cases
that, in actuality, did deal with them. For instance, Tracey v. State, 152 So.
3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014) is a good candidate, referencing a pen/trap order, a
confidential informant, and “cell site location information given off by cell
phones when calls are placed.” Although not definitive, these terms are
certainly indicative of stingray device use. This court suppressed evidence
obtained from warrantless real-time tracking. I credit Jonathan Manes’ paper
for this case example; see Jonathan Manes, Secrecy and Evasion in Police
Surveillance Technology, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 503, 518-19 (2019).
96
See Department of Justice Policy Guidance, supra note 41, at 3.
97
Id. at 5.
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new warrant requirement was one of policy, not of law.98 Still, the
department’s policy change appears to have prompted a change in court
rulings.
After this policy change, state and federal courts started ruling
consistently that the government needed to obtain a warrant to use
stingray devices. Federal courts explicitly referenced the DOJ policy
change.99 The first state-level decision came from the Maryland
Supreme Court in 2016, and it referenced the DOJ policy change.100
This decision prompted a cascade of conforming lower court decisions
within the state.101 In other states, all decisions issued since have
consistently required a warrant for stingray device use; three of these
also cited to the 2015 DOJ policy guidance.102 It seems plausible that
98

Id. at 3.
For a list of non-exhaustive federal examples, see United States v. Lambis,
197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); United States v. Ellis, 270 F. Supp.
3d 1134, 1139 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 705
(D.C. 2017). See also United States v. Tutis, 216 F. Supp. 3d 467, 482 (D.N.J.
2016) (where the district court decided that a state statutory requirement was
not materially different from a search warrant and was, as such, sufficient).
All of these cases referenced the 2015 DOJ policy change.
100
State v. Andrews, 227 Md. App. 350, 357 n.20 (2016) (Notably, the case
does not cite to the previous Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, Tate, even
though neither the DOJ policy nor Wisconsin law is binding on Maryland
courts.).
101
The following cases were all consistent with the Andrews holding, although
most did not grant suppression of evidence by virtue of the good faith
exception, see State v. Copes, No. 0580, 2016 Md. App. (App. Oct. 25, 2016);
Anthony Banks v. State, No. 553, 2017 Md. App. (App. Jan. 26, 2017); State
v. Copes, 454 Md. 581, 165 A.3d 418 (2017); Morales-Caceres v. State, No.
1086, 2017 Md. App. (App. Dec. 5, 2017); Elmore v. State, No. 504, 2019
Md. App. LEXIS 649 (App. Aug. 2, 2019); Baskerville v. State, No. 2865,
2018 Md. App.(App. July 20, 2018); Edwards v. State, No. 205, 2018 Md.
App. LEXIS 890 (App. Sep. 24, 2018); Hicks v. State, No. 629, 2019 Md.
App. LEXIS 782 (App. Sep. 6, 2019); Diggs v. State, No. 1728, 2019 Md.
App. LEXIS 1056 (App. Dec. 6, 2019).
102
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts effectively required warrants for
stingray use in Commonwealth v. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d 1183, 1193 (2019),
but the court opinion only mentions stingray devices in a footnote. See id. at
1193 n.13. However, the case does reference the Supreme Court of
Maryland’s decision. See id. at 1202 n.2. Some State court opinions finding a
Fourth Amendment violation also cite DOJ policy change. See e.g., Jones v.
United States, 168 A.3d 703, 721 (D.C. 2017); State v. Sylvestre, 254 So. 3d
986, 991 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 2018) (cites DOJ policy change); People v.
Gordon, 58 Misc. 3d 544, 546 (Sup. Ct. 2017); People v. Smith, IL App (1st)
99
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the federal policy change had an effect on both state litigants’
willingness to challenge stingray device use and to state courts’
willingness to require warrant use.
Still, no final doctrinal answer on the device’s constitutional status
exists, given that higher courts have not addressed the question
directly. Nor have they directly addressed the question of what legal
authorization is required for prospective location tracking, although the
majority of federal courts require warrants.103 The Supreme Court did
recently require a warrant for historical location tracking data in United
States v. Carpenter, which lends constitutional credence to the
customary warrant requirement for prospective tracking but does not
definitively settle the question.104 The stingray device case history
demonstrates that courts have the benefit of slow evolution, but lack
legal agility—a particularly acute problem when technological
innovation enables novel means of surveillance. This litigation history
also demonstrates the impact that administrative change can have on
judicial constitutional decision-making.
4. Additional Legal Issues
a. Proprietary
Oversight

Interests

Hinder

Judicial

The above history of stingray device litigation demonstrates that
sophisticated investigative technologies have not always gotten a fair
airing in court, complicating judicial determination of what legal
process properly applies. Government agencies have not disclosed, or
have not disclosed the full extent of, the nature of stingray devices used
during searches. In addition to the above examples, the experience of
North Port, Florida (pop. ~70,000) is particularly telling. The North
141814-UB (Dec. 27, 2017) (ineffective assistance of counsel claim upheld
based on lack of challenge to evidence of stingray use); People v. McDuffie,
2017 58 Misc. 3d 524 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (granting further hearing on whether
surveillance had been lawfully obtained). In contrast, some state court
opinions uphold use of stingray devices on the basis of adequate warrant. See
e.g., Jenkins v. State, 2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 2912; Andres v. State, 254 So.
3d (Fla. 2018) 283, 297-98; People v. Johnson, 25 Cal. App. 5th 588, 624-26
(2018); Commonwealth v. McLendon, 221 A.3d 323 1, 6 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2019); Wheeler v. State, 209 A.3d 24 1, 1 (Del. 2019).
103
Eric Lode, Validity of Use of Cellular Telephone or Tower to Track
Prospective, Real Time, or Historical Position of Possessor of Phone
Under Fourth Amendment, 92 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1, 17-20 (2015) (collecting
cases).
104
Carpenter v. United States, supra note 19, at 2218-21 (2018).
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Port police amended a probable cause affidavit to remove details about
stingray devices after pressure from an assistant state attorney, who
himself seemingly acted at the request of the U.S. Marshals.105 Court
documents in Florida indicate police forces used a wide range of vague
terms to substitute for descriptions of stingray devices, including
“confidential intelligence.”106
Private sector pressure contributes to this lack of transparency.
Most, if not all, police forces that borrowed or purchased stingray
devices signed non-disclosure agreements with the FBI and/or the
Harris Corporation barring them from revealing details about the
technology’s use in court. For instance, in the Tallahassee apartment
case described above, the police only revealed the use of stingray
devices six years after the incident took place.107 In Baltimore, the
Police Department’s nondisclosure agreement stipulated that the
department and associated agencies, “shall not, in any civil or criminal
proceeding, use or provide any information concerning the Harris
Corporation wireless collection equipment/technology, its associated
software, operating manuals, and any related documentation . . .
beyond the evidentiary results obtained through the use of the
equipment/technology.”108
Pressure came not only from the private vendors but from the
federal government. The Baltimore police were required to alert the
FBI so it could intervene if it looked like any actor was seeking to
introduce this kind of evidence in court.109 This kind of intervention
105

See E-mail from Kenneth Castro, Sergeant, Sarasota Police Department, to
Terry Lewis, Chief, North Port Police Department (April 15, 2009, 11:25 AM)
(on file with the ACLU) (Stingray device was not named but described in the
emails as “equipment which enables law enforcement to ping a suspects cell
phone and pin point his/her exact location.”).
106
See Tallahassee Police Dep’t Incident Report, Case Report No. 00-0803725 (Dec. 1, 2008) (on file with the ACLU) (“Confidential intelligence
indicated that property stolen during the home invasion robbery was in the
area ….”).
107
Klonick, supra note 93 ("[I]t wasn’t until 2014, six years after Thomas’
arrest, that his lawyers found out that a Stingray had been the basis for entering
Thomas’ apartment.”).
108
Letter from Ernest Reith, Acting Assistant Dir., FBI, to Frederick H.
Bealefeld, III, Police Comm’r, Baltimore Police Department (July 13, 2011)
(on file with the U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
109
Id. (“If the Baltimore Police Department [and other associated agencies] …
learns that a District Attorney, prosecutor, or court is considering or intends
to use or provide any information concerning the Harris Corporation wireless
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actually did occur in Sarasota, Florida: U.S. Marshals raided a Sarasota
police office to remove documents that were being reviewed in
response to a FOIA request regarding Stingray use.110
The government has been so committed to these nondisclosure
agreements that they have dropped cases when defense attorneys have
pressed for technical details about investigative tools. In Baltimore,
prosecutors quickly agreed to drop a case rather than reveal how crucial
information was obtained when pressed by the defense.111 In
Tallahassee, after a judge asked for more information on the
investigative tool used, the police offered a better plea deal in exchange
for not revealing that information.112 But, in many other cases, defense
attorneys didn’t press, or didn’t know to press, for this information. The
fates of defendants have, then, been dependent on the effectiveness of
counsel rather than proper procedure—not the way the Fourth
Amendment is supposed to work. The ubiquity of NDAs and the rapid
withdrawal of cases when more information is requested means courts
are being hobbled in functioning as proper arbiters this technology.
Indeed, only a few judges have pushed back against the vagueness of
government submissions about the tools used in searches.113 Whatever
collection equipment/technology . . . in a manner that will cause law
enforcement sensitive information relating to the technology to be known to
the public, [these agencies] will immediately notify the FBI in order to allow
for sufficient time for the FBI to intervene to protect the equipment/technology
and information from disclosure and potential compromise.”)
110
Kim Zetter, U.S. Marshals Seize Cops’ Spying Records to Keep Them
from the ACLU, WIRED (June 3, 2014, 6:15 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2014/06/feds-seize-stingray-documents/.
111
See Brad Heath, Police Secretly Track Cellphones to Solve Routine
Crimes, USA TODAY (Aug. 23, 2015, 4:50 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/videos/tech/personal/technologylive/2015/08/24/
32131267/) (last updated Aug. 24, 2015). See also Official Transcript of
Proceedings (Motions Hearing), 73, State of Maryland v. Taylor, No.
114140031 (2014).
112
Trevor Aaronson, Hacking Team Data Breach Provides Links to Florida
Law Enforcement, TAMPA BAY TIMES (July 11, 2015)
https://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/hacking-team-data-breachprovides-links-to-florida-law-enforcement/2237006/.
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See In re Warrant to Search Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958
F. Supp. 2d 753, 759 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (“This ‘method’ of software installation
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technology’”). See also Orin Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence:
the Case for Use Restrictions on Nonresponsive Data, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV.
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legal process courts decide to require for stingray devices use, this lack
of transparency decreases the ability of that court oversight to actually
reach these technologies.
b. The Human Factor: Multifunctionality,
Mistakes, and Malfeasance
Stingray devices, as described above, can collect more types of
data than phone numbers, with the same device potentially requiring
different types of legal processes for different use cases. A 2005 copy
of the DOJ’s Electronic Surveillance Manual confirms that “[d]igital
analyzers/cell site simulators/triggerfish and similar devices may be
capable of intercepting the contents of communications.”114 Guidance
from a major stingray vendor states their devices that are capable of
“intercepting outgoing calls and SMS messages sent by a target.”115 In
response, DOJ policy required that, without further legal process,
stingrays must be configured as pen registers.116 Furthermore, after
2015, federal law enforcement requires warrants for stingray device
use as a matter of policy, but not of law.117
The ability of one technological device to collect multiple types
of data does not present an insurmountably difficult legal problem, but
it does present a challenging human one. The government is capable of
compliantly using a multi-capacity investigatory tool—by applying for
the correct legal approval for each type of data collection. This
complexity, however, raises the chances of mistakes and malfeasance.
For instance, in the past, when the FBI has used malware that obtains
multiple types of differently-protected data, it has sometimes failed to
apply for the stricter form of legal process.118 Similar failures could
1, 15 (2015) (for Orrin Kerr’s arguments regarding particularity’s problems
with digital searches).
114
Electronic Surveillance Unit, Electronic Surveillance Manual: Procedures
and Case Law Forms, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 41 (2005).
115
Gamma Group, 3G-GSM Tactical Interception & Target Location, at 9.
See also PKI Electronic Intelligence GmbH Germany, Active GSM
Monitoring System, available at http://www.pkielectronic.com/products/interception-and-monitoring-systems/active-gsmmonitoring-system/.
116
See Electronic Surveillance Manual, supra note 114, at 41. See also DOJ
Stingray Guide (2015), supra note 41, at 2.
117
DOJ Stingray Guide (2015), supra note 41, at 3.
118
See In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown,
supra note 113, at 759-61. See also Mayer, supra note 10 (activation of
computer webcam required “super-warrant” protections, adherence to wiretap
standards).
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occur in the stingray device context. Of course, the lack of
transparency regarding stingray device usage might frustrate judicial
attempts to determine such failures. Similarly, law enforcement is
required to minimize collected data not relevant to the ongoing
investigation; but, based on volume alone, devices that collect a
broader range of data increase the risk that minimization techniques
will contain errors. Furthermore, local and state agencies do not have
the same resources, legal advice, or coordination abilities as federal law
enforcement, magnifying the potential for confusion or mistakes.
Widespread use of these kinds of technologies by police puts pressure
on legal protections to do more work—technologies with many
capacities do not have the required embedded technological hard-stops.
Such technologies also put pressure on non-search-related legal
processes. Acquisition of surveillance technologies have sometimes
been kept from public view, skirting the intended oversight procedures.
For instance, the Chicago police, which have had stingray devices since
at least 2008, purchased at least a portion of these and other
surveillance capabilities using a narcotics asset forfeiture fund, the
“1505” fund.119 Using these funds allows the police to bypass the City
Council budget process.120 Council members were thus not informed
or aware of the police department’s use of these technologies for four
years, until activists started requesting public records.121 As a
consequence, they had no opportunity to undertake any oversight
activities. Surveillance technology, in this manner, exerts legal
pressure on multiple sites of governance.
c. Mission Creep and Enforcement Discretion
Even though state and local law enforcement grant applications
often list anti-terrorism efforts as validation for acquiring sophisticated
investigative technologies, these tools also end up being used to solve

119
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low-level theft, identify prison contraband, and locate witnesses.122
These are permissible and legal exercises of police power. At the same
time, enforcement discretion is a concept built into the criminal justice
system.123 Sophisticated investigative technologies reduce resource
constraints and allow police to access more data for a wider range of
crimes. Resource constraints motivate enforcement discretion; with
lessened constraints comes fewer material reasons for such
discretion.124 Deciding when surveillance tools can be used purely on
the basis of material constraints preempts a wider democratic
discussion about the role of enforcement discretion in policing.125
C. Mobile Forensics Devices
1. “Hack and Crack” Introduction
If you’ve ever forgotten your iPhone’s password, tried a few
guesses, and then been informed you are running out of attempts and
will be locked out of your phone, you have experienced some of the
frustration police officers face when trying to unlock suspects’ phones.
Password cracking can sometimes be the only way to get into a phone,
given default iPhone encryption—especially when suspects have died.
Private companies have stepped in to provide devices that bypass the
“too many guesses” protection: these devices first “hack” iPhones,
exploiting vulnerabilities in the software that allow disabling of this
protective feature. The devices can then proceed to crack the password
in hours or days.126
122

Baltimore Police Dep’t, Response to Request 060815 (2015) (on file with
USA Today).
123
See generally DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY POLICING, supra note 11; see also
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CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 249 (1984).
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See generally Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107
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Estrangement, 126 Yale L.J. 2054, 2054 (2017); see also Dan M. Kahan and
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GEO. L.J. 1153, 1153 (1998). See Floyd Weatherspoon, Ending Racial
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126
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The story of mobile forensic devices mirrors the stingray device
story in many ways: the devices trickled down from federal to state use,
and their use has been marked by debate, although less extensive than
in the stingray device context, over what legal authorization is required
to use them. This section will focus, however, on two additional legal
risks that mobile forensics devices pose. These risks highlight existing
shortcomings in non-judicial systems of oversight of these
technologies. First, these devices demonstrate the difficulties in
crafting effective oversight at the site of exchange of technologies from
federal to local law enforcement. The history of mobile forensics
devices demonstrates how gaps can appear between systems designed
for local governance and systems designed for federal governance
when technologies move between the two. Second, the history of these
devices demonstrates the shortcomings of relying on procurement
policy alone to counter the risks that local police surveillance carries.
2. Technical Details and Use Statistics
Physically, mobile forensics devices are small, around four inches
on a side, with cables that connect to iPhones.127 The licenses to
cheaper, newer models called Graykey made by the company
GrayShift cost between $15,000 (allowing 300 unlocks at $50 per
device) and $30,000 (unlimited unlocks) per year and work, as of April
2018.128
Cellebrite, one of the main companies selling these devices and
licenses, has been in the mobile forensics market since 2007, the same
year the first iPhone came out.129 The FBI has contracts with this Israeli
company going back to 2009.130 Worldwide, Cellebrite has distributed
60,000 licenses in 150 countries.131 The company’s main model is the
Universal Forensic Extraction Device (UFED), but it has offered a
changing array of devices that adapt as mobile technology changes.132
127
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The federal government released a report on Cellebrite technology
performance on a range of phones in 2012, demonstrating widespread
government interest in the technology.133 Cellebrite’s major competitor
is Swedish firm MSAB, with reports of at least six other companies
active in the space, including the relatively new U.S. firm GrayShift.
At least four federal agencies possess Cellebrite or Grayshift
forensics technology, with the earliest acquisitions in 2009.134 The FBI
started acquiring other kinds of mobile forensics technologies around
2003, although it is likely an even older feature of federal law
enforcement investigations.135
Local and state law enforcement first had access to mobile
forensics capabilities through FBI programs. Initially, local and state
agents could request full forensics examinations from FBI personnel,
but extensive backlogs built up.136 In response, the FBI introduced a
fast-track option, “Cell Phone Investigative Kiosks,” which were
available for local and state agents to use at FBI field offices and
Regional Computer Forensics Laboratories.137 Agents could use the
kiosks on a walk-in basis, and agents were usually required to use this
133
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option before requesting a full forensic phone investigation from the
FBI.138 The kiosks were clunky and stationary, and could only extract
and preview a limited amount of data. But they still provided some
technical capabilities to state and local officers and demonstrated
forensics cooperation between the FBI and other law enforcement
agencies.
As of 2016, according to public records requests, twenty state
agencies had mobile forensic capabilities.139 As of August 2020, at
least twenty-three local agencies had mobile forensics capabilities.140
The most prevalent brand in use among state and local agencies is
Cellebrite, but agencies also possess devices made by MSAB, Susteen,
Grayshift, and Oxygen Forensics (a Russian company).
Based on a review of publicly available documents, most state law
enforcement agencies first acquired these devices between 20102014.141 Local departments tended to make their first acquisitions of
Cellebrite between 2012-2016, with a few earlier and later outliers.142
For instance, Baltimore County police purchased Susteen equipment in
2008 and Cellebrite technology in 2009, essentially at the same time as
the FBI acquired Cellebrite technology.143 Baltimore County, then,
bucks the general trend that technology tends to be adopted first by the
federal level and then by state and local level. Decreasing product
prices and aggressive marketing by surveillance tech companies
directed at local and state agencies may be shortening the expected time
lag between federal and state or local acquisition—making the need to
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address the risks of these technologies at the state and local level all the
more pressing.
3. Legal Issues
a. Police Use Technological Change to Broaden
Existing Fourth Amendment Exceptions
As with stingray devices, mobile forensics tools have raised
questions about appropriate legal authorization. But with these devices,
I want to highlight a slightly different angle of this question: the push
and pull over the right amount of legal authorization that accompanies
changes in technological friction. The following example highlights the
need for governance that can respond to changing circumstances.
In areas where legal friction is already low—such as the
diminished Fourth Amendment protections that apply at the border and
to searches pursuant to consent—the decreased technological friction
of new surveillance technologies magnifies the legal risks. Indeed,
police departments have already used mobile forensic technologies in
border searches.144 Police departments have also used them in searches
pursuant to consent.145 Courts have, so far, pushed back, recognizing
that these areas of legal leeway were crafted before it was possible to
“keep the intimate data available on modern cell phones indefinitely
and search through it at any time.” 146 Still, the law is still evolving, and
ultimate legal answers may take years to emerge, as with stingrays.
Change in legal arguments can also happen in response to
increases in technological friction. In 2018, Apple announced a
software update that frustrated common police use of mobile forensic
devices.147 This update “locked” an iPhone’s cable port after one hour
of not being used to prevent police and others from using plug-in
144
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mobile forensics tools. Thus, Apple introduced greater technological
friction into the process. In response, law enforcement sought to reduce
the legal friction required to use such tools. After this change was
announced, the Department of Justice began contemplating using the
“exigent circumstances” exception to Fourth Amendment procedures
to gain access to devices in response to the shortened time frame.148
Essentially, they wanted to implement a “copy first, get warrant later”
approach to devices given the time pressures introduced by the Apple
software update.149 This approach could result in every suspect’s phone
being downloaded pursuant to an exception to the Fourth Amendment,
perverting the nature of exigent circumstances. Based on unresponsive
public records searches, this approach does not appear to have been
adopted yet, but the example demonstrates the legal uncertainty that
can happen in response to technological changes in surveillance tools,
even when the underlying questions of law appear relatively settled
(i.e., you do need a warrant to review the contents of a phone). This
fluidity underscores the need for responsive Fourth Amendment
governance.
b. Lack of Oversight at the Point of TrickleDown
The movement of technology from the federal government to
local agencies can also be a site of where existing systems of
governance, judicial and non-judicial, fail. With stingray devices, we
saw how non-disclosure agreements led to stingray devices being
shielded form judicial scrutiny. Mobile forensics devices provide two
additional examples of failure at the site of exchange. First, federal
grants and loans undermine local control of policing by bypassing
established channels of local governance.150 As scholars have set out at
length in other work, devices purchased or obtained through federal
grants essentially short-circuit local governance mechanisms that are
not built to consider this kind of outside funding.151 Trickle-down
surveillance technologies thus become a way for the federal
government to assert its policy priorities within local institutions over
which it has no formal control.152 Thinking comprehensively about
148
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governance of surveillance tools thus requires addressing municipal
polices on accepting federal aid—an issue which certainly is not raised
by individual Fourth Amendment challenges.
Second, gaps in oversight in local borrowing or use of federal
tools can lead to increased possibilities for abuse.153 In these
circumstances, judicial review of abuse certainly provides a
backstop—if such abuses come to light. Still, this risk is worth noting,
and the cell phone investigative kiosks (CPIKs), an early form of
mobile forensics trickle-down, provide a good example of such a gap
happening. FBI field offices, regional computer forensic laboratories,
and resident agencies (scaled-down field offices) house CPIKs that
local and state agencies can use to view, extract, and store data on a
cell phone.154 Multiple FBI audits have reported significant concerns
about the potential for abuse of these walk-in hacking kiosks by local
and state law enforcement.155
For example, the New Jersey office’s kiosk is located in its
reception area.156 Although the device technically requires an
appointment to use, local and state agents are not required to sign the
visitors log and not required to demonstrate that all members of their
party are related to the stated investigation.157 A 2016 audit reported
that the “check” in place at the New Jersey site involved keeping the
cables needed to access the kiosk with an on-site official.158 Although
the audit concluded this method was sufficient, in reality, this method
was ineffective. These cables are likely commonly available consumer
electronics, meaning local or state agents could bring their own set,
and, even if they are proprietary, such cables are probably available
through other means to someone within law enforcement.159
More importantly, no effective system existed to verify that local
and state officials possessed the necessary legal authorities to use the
kiosks to search devices. The 2016 Inspector General’s report on the
153
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New Jersey Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory (NJRCFL)
stated that “neither the FBI nor the NJRCFL provided any confirmation
to show that NJRCFL Kiosk users possessed the proper legal authority
to search for evidence on the devices examined.”160 Specifically, the
form users are required to fill out before using the kiosk “does not
request that the person . . . list the specific legal authority for the
examination, nor does it even offer a list of possible legal authorities
for conducting such a search” against which the stated reason could be
checked.161 In addition, “the FBI did not provide us with any
information regarding controls in place at the NJRCFL to ensure that
users do not use the Kiosk for non-law enforcement matters, an
inherent risk of Kiosks without adequate controls.”162 All of these
features mean that local and state law enforcement officials, lacking
proper knowledge, or seeking to skirt legal requirements, could do so.
This scenario demonstrates several risks common across local and
state use of sophisticated investigative technologies. First, we only
know about these failings in the kiosk context because of the Inspector
General’s report. State and local law enforcement agencies do not
uniformly have that same kind of independent oversight, potentially
allowing possible sites of abuse to go undetected. Second, the scenario
raises two failings of the federal government when it comes to assisting
local surveillance: the federal government has too much control in the
sense that its grant process can bypass local procurement decisionmaking, and, simultaneously, the federal government has too little
control, in the sense that it fails to implement adequate supervision for
local use of federal tools.
c. Accelerated Marketing Targeting Local
Police and Procurement Policy Pressures
The acquisition patterns of mobile forensics technologies suggest
that, increasingly, surveillance tools will be sold directly to local and
state law enforcement rather than flowing through the federal
government to localities. The lag time between federal acquisition of
the most recent generation of mobile forensics tools and local
acquisition is significantly diminished compared to stingray devices.
Where state and local acquisition of stingray devices lagged by half a
decade or a decade behind federal acquisition, state acquisition of
Cellebrite technology and similar devices lagged only by two to four
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years, with local acquisition still lagging five to ten years.163 With a
notable exception—Baltimore acquired its own Cellebrite devices in
2009, at the same time federal law enforcement agencies did.164
This acceleration at the state and local level is reinforced by the
marketing practices of several other surveillance companies. Clearview
AI, which sells a facial recognition product to law enforcement that
allows agents to compare suspects with a database of online
photographs, has experienced sales success by offering free trials to
individual officers within police departments, who then lobby their
departments to acquire the software and endorse the product within
police circles.165 Amazon has also aggressively targeted local police
departments with marketing campaigns for its Ring surveillance
doorbell.166
This direct-to-locals approach increases the ways in which
private companies can assert leverage over police policies, including
restricting what details they can reveal in court through NDAs or
intellectual property-based challenges, causing transparency
problems.167 A reporter covering Clearview AI even discovered that the
company monitors what faces police departments run through the app
and rebukes them for speaking to the media—which indicates the
ability to pressure departments regarding other uses, too.168 Local
departments, with limited resources and high local democratic pressure
to solve crimes, may be more susceptible to aggressive marketing
tactics and less sophisticated negotiating partners than federal law
enforcement.
Procurement policy regulates how police acquire new tools. As
such, it has been held up as a potential locus of oversight of surveillance
tools. Procurement policy is definitely part of the solution, but it is not
designed to provide the kind of comprehensive governance needed to
163
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address all of the risks that accompany these surveillance tools. First,
procurement policy is a child of broader municipal or state budgeting
processes, during which many competing factors, especially fiscal
factors, matter. Second, such processes do not necessarily afford
opportunities for a range of stakeholder voices to be present, raising
concerns about the democratic accountability of such processes. Third,
the central goal of procurement policy is to determine whether and how
a tool should be acquired; it is not structured to provide the kind of finegrain control over use of technologies that these tools’ risks require.
Fourth, placing oversight solely at the site of acquisition encourages
police to skirt formal processes in favor of other procurement avenues.
For instance, Chicago police, have used $417,000 worth of civil asset
forfeiture money from 2010-2016 to purchase stingray devices,
bypassing normal procurement procedures.169
Procurement policy can offer helpful lessons for administrative
governance and form a part of a comprehensive governance scheme.
Indeed, procurement provisions can be a helpful part of broader
administrative strategies. For instance, a broader administrative
governance scheme could require that procurement contracts cannot be
accompanied by non-disclosure agreements with private entities. But,
overall, non-judicial governance needs to be broader than what
procurement policy can offer.
D. Summary of Limits of Judicial Oversight
The next Part investigates how local administrative governance
can respond to these challenges. But, I’ll first bring together the legal
difficulties of local surveillance technology for a more comprehensive
picture.
These sophisticated investigative technologies both
exacerbate existing criticisms of judicial oversight and introduce new
concerns.
The above sections tell a story of judicial deference: when
sophisticated investigative technologies present questions of unsettled
law, courts have tended to defer to government arguments over the
arguments of defendants. Courts did not always do so; indeed, courts
rightly challenged government policy regarding the legal authorization
required for using stingray devices for location tracking. But, at the
early stages of the technology’s use, and towards the later stages, courts
were generally deferential towards government policy and sometimes
only became stricter only after an administrative policy change at the
federal government level. Judicial deference towards law enforcement
169

Handley et al., supra note 120.
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is a well-documented phenomenon, but sophisticated investigative
technologies aggravate this trend.170 This deference likely contributes
to the failure of courts to decide crucial questions about investigative
technologies in a technologically meaningful timespan. Courts are
notoriously slow; although this staid pace has the advantages of
caution, it is particularly mismatched to the pace of technological
change, in several instances leaving crucial questions unanswered and
vulnerable groups unprotected for a decade.
Judicial deference towards government or law enforcement
perspectives motivates another oft-raised criticism of judicial
oversight, that it lacks democratic legitimacy.171 Clearly, enough
pressure existed for the federal government to change its policy on
stingray devices, but the courts were not responsive to this same
pressure until that federal administrative policy change occurred. Until
that point, the courts, as described above, continued to bolster law
enforcement perspectives. This dynamic raises the possibility of
needing some external force—legislative or administrative—to prompt
judicial change.
The involvement of private companies as vendors of sophisticated
investigative technologies introduces significant concerns about
transparency in legal proceedings, limiting the ability of courts to carry
out proper adjudication of Fourth Amendment questions. A double
pressure towards secrecy exists with regards to sophisticated
investigative technologies: governments want to keep investigative
methods secret and vendors want to protect trade secret information.
This double pressure may require external intervention to require or
incentivize transparency on the part of the government and/or vendors
to allow courts to carry out effective oversight.
The technologies above raise considerations that the traditional
Fourth Amendment analysis is not built to analyze.172 In typical Fourth
Amendment analyses, courts do not ask the questions raised here: is
this tool appropriate for use in relation to this crime? Did the federal
government set up adequate controls over technology before lending or
giving it to state and local agencies? Is this tool appropriate for use
170

For general instances of courts privileging law enforcement perspectives,
see Friedman and Ponomarenko, supra note 4, at 1891-92; Sklansky, Two
More Ways Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 223, 227-33 (2015).
171
Friedman and Ponomarenko, supra note 4, at 1827.
172
See Renan, supra note 3, at 1039 (Renan terms this typical method
“transactional” Fourth Amendment analysis, between the defendant and the
government).
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despite the public externalities it generates? Did private actors restrict
what government representatives can say in court or do in the field?
Courts are still a critical component of Fourth Amendment
oversight and are equipped to address some of the complexities
introduced by sophisticated investigative tools. Questions surrounding
appropriate notice of digital searches, for instance, could be addressed
by courts, and courts have shown early signs of pushing back against
using technology to widen existing legal loopholes.173 Although courts
cannot prevent law enforcement from making mistakes with
multifunctional devices, they can exert ex post penalties. Similarly,
conflicts between federal and state or local use of overlapping digital
tools are likely to arise, and courts, as the arbiter of preemption
questions, would be the suitable forum to adjudicate such conflicts.
Courts should remain a central and active component of Fourth
Amendment oversight, but that does not preclude augmenting their
judgment with other governance tools better suited to modulating the
particular risks that accompany local use of surveillance tools.
II.

THE CASE FOR LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE
A. What is Local Administrative Governance?
1. General Structure of Local
Governance: Two Models

Administrative

Administrative governance has three key features: it separates the
rule makers from those whom the rules regulate, limits the discretion
by which decisions will be made, and establishes such criteria before
decisions occur. When looking for administrative governance at the
local level, it is these features this Article focuses on; many of the
structural aspects of traditional administrative governance look
different at the local level.
173

Some courts have started requiring ex ante search protocols, including
delineating particular pockets of stored data that are more sensitive and
protections for examining them. See, e.g., In re [Redacted]@gmail.com, 62.
F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1102-04 (N.D. Cal.) (re a cloud service search, suggesting
that the government must request information subject to date restrictions and
commit to disposing the information after its relevant use); In re Search of
Info. Associated with [Redacted]@mac.com, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4-9 (D.D.C.
2014) (calling for use of screening criteria to narrow a request to an online
service); United States v. Winn, No. 14-CR30169-NJR, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15240, at *25-35 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2015) (invalidating a warrant to
search a phone for “any or all files contained on said phone” as insufficiently
particular).
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Local administrative governance of police investigative
technology looks something like this: a city council or appointed
commission would be empowered to regulate the acquisition and use
of surveillance technologies by local police. The rules made by such a
body would establish the general principles by which specific decisions
about particular technologies would be made as they arise. As police
seek to acquire new technologies, the body would apply these
established principles of decision-making to particular scenarios.
Among the general principles that these bodies should adopt are
requiring approval for acquisition and use plans for technologies,
banning or requiring transparency for NDAs, and granting standing to
challenge acquisitions that fail to conform to the guidelines.174 In
addition, I argue that such principles should include warrant
requirements, restrictions on sharing or borrowing equipment with
other local or state law enforcement agencies, and approval
requirements for borrowing from the federal government.
This approach broadly describes what a small but growing
number of cities are doing with respect to surveillance technologies.
Cities have generally implemented one of two versions of local
administrative governance of surveillance. The first form is closer in
form to traditional administrative governance, involving a separate
administrative agency, and is often adopted by better-resourced cities.
Here, a city council establishes an administrative agency or board that
receives and reviews surveillance impact and use plans and annual
reports. Even in this form, however, the city council usually retains
final approval, a key difference from traditional administrative
governance. Another difference is that the regulated agencies draft the
initial use plans and present them to the administrative body for
approval—rather than the administrative body acting as the drafter of
those plans.
The second form of local administrative governance operates
similarly, but no separate administrative body exists—the city council
performs both legislative and administrative functions. In this model,
the city council, in its legislative capacity, passes an ordinance
establishing the procedures for review of rules about surveillance
technologies. Then, in its administrative capacity, the city council
reviews and approves or denies these policies. Practically, the
differences between these two administrative governance models have
174

These basic principles are included in a model bill put forward by the
ACLU in AN ACT TO PROMOTE TRANSPARENCY AND PROTECT CIVIL RIGHTS
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES WITH RESPECT TO SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY (AM.
CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 2018).
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efficiency and local political consequences. Legally, these different
structures have consequences for judicial review of the underlying
rules, discussed further below.
Based on my research, no city has adopted completely
independent rulemaking by a separate administrative body, akin to
traditional administrative governance, an approach I and other scholars
endorse.175 Given this reality, my analysis proceeds largely on the basis
of the forms of local administrative oversight that currently exist, while
recognizing that the more traditional model has desirable advantages.
The remainder of this paper provides a theoretical grounding for
existing efforts, presents the first structured survey of existing
municipal efforts, notes where current efforts fall short, and
demonstrates the possibilities of this approach moving forward.
2. Administrative versus Legislative Functions of
City Governments
The intertwined structure of city governments—where legislative
and executive power are often shared—offers an opportunity for a
unique kind of administrative-style governance at the local level. Local
governments, in contrast to the tripartite federal government, the focus
of most administrative scholarship, take many different forms. Larger
cities may have traditional, stand-alone agencies, while in others, city
councils occupy both legislative and administrative roles. In these
smaller cities, city councils can serve both as the legislating body
(passing legislation) and as an administrative body (implementing
specifics of legislation). Regardless of their structure, local
governments do engage in tasks that can be classified as administrative
governance. Local governments set zoning rules, for example. If a city
has separate agencies, a zoning board might do this task; if not, local
zoning rules may be passed by the city council itself, demonstrating the
blended nature of administrative tasks at the local level.
Local governments have developed ways of distinguishing
between the legislative and administrative roles that city councils shift
between. When these roles are shared by councils, officially a
legislative body, a common way to distinguish between these roles is
to differentiate broader governing rules passed by councils and
implementations of those rules. For instance, the state of New York
gives municipal “laws” greater legal weight than municipal
“ordinances,” emphasizing that laws are more legislative in character

175

See especially Ponomarenko, supra note 14.
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and ordinances more administrative in character.176 In my hometown
of Bloomington, Indiana, a similar distinction exists. Broadly,
“resolutions” state policy positions and “ordinances” implement them
(note that in other cities, the meanings of these two terms are reversed,
and ordinances are the broader mechanism).177 The important point to
grasp is that the same body, the city council, adopts both types of rules.
To apply this structure to the local police technology context, a city
council might, by exercising its legislative function through a
resolution, state an intention to “increase protections for citizens
regarding sophisticated police technology.” The Council would then
work to develop an ordinance that lays out the kinds of protections
contemplated in Section 1 above (NDA prohibition, etc.). Once the
ordinance is developed, the council would approve individual
acquisitions on the basis of the principles outlined in the ordinance.
This vision of local administrative governance is not theoretical
when it comes to law enforcement more broadly. San Francisco has
implemented a version of this kind of governance with respect to their
police force (although it does not deal with police technology). San
Francisco has an appointed administrative body, the Police
Commission, which oversees the police force. The Commission sets
policies for the police department (through a mechanism called General
Orders).178 Beginning in 2008, the Commission promulgated a General
Order requiring police have an elevated “reasonable suspicion” before
beginning an investigation that might implicate First Amendment

176
See NEW YORK STATE MUNICIPAL HOME RULE LAW, § 2(9) (“A law (a)
adopted pursuant to this chapter or to other authorization of a state statute or
charter by the legislative body of a local government, or (b) proposed by a
charter commission or by petition, and ratified by popular vote, as provided in
article four of this chapter or as provided in a state statute, charter or local law;
but shall not mean or include an ordinance, resolution or other similar act of
the legislative body or of any other board or body.”)
177
For instance, the 2018 Comprehensive Management Plan, adopted by
resolution, stated an intention to “increase efficiency of parking inventory by
providing more dedicated parking for two-wheeled motorized and nonmotorized vehicles.” A 2019 ordinance implemented part of this goal, with 15
pages of detailed code updates to address motorized scooters, down to specific
portions of blocks that can be used as dismount zones. See 2018
Comprehensive Plan, CITY OF BLOOMINGTON (2018); Bloomington, In.,
Ordinance 19-09 To Amend Title 15 of the Bloomington Municipal Code
Entitled “Vehicles and Traffic” (July 31, 2019).
178
General Orders, SF POLICE, https://www.sanfranciscopolice.org/yoursfpd/policies/general-orders.
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activities.179 However, the City sometimes cooperated with the FBI,
and the City’s agreement with the FBI required officers to conform to
a lower suspicion standard.180 Controversy over this discrepancy
ensued. The city council responded by building on the administrative
General Order by passing a legislative ordinance that required city
officers to follow city rules even when cooperating with the feds; it also
required future local-federal cooperation agreements to undergo public
disclosure and comment.181 This example shows the blending of
legislative and administrative functions that can happen at the local
level. Here, the city council delegated general police rulemaking to the
Police Commission. The Police Commission issued an administrative
order on investigation standards, and the city council stepped back in
to reinforce the standard through a legislative ordinance. Yet, the
council’s introduction of a requirement for notice and comment on
future cooperation agreements is also administrative in nature, echoing
administrative practices by federal agencies. Administrative
governance at the local level is almost always a blend of actions by
legislative and administrative (in the traditional sense) bodies. Many of
the aims of this kind of governance are the same as those of traditional
administrative governance; at the local level, we can recognize the
complexity of the actors and, at the same time, the administrative
nature of the governance.
3. Police Rulemaking: the
Administrative Governance

Wrong

Kind

of

The majority of existing scholarship supporting administrative
governance of the police advocates specifically for police
rulemaking.182 By police rulemaking, scholars usually mean something
akin to the following, to use an example from the canonical work on
police rulemaking: a police department passes a rule requiring formal
lineups in addition to photographic exhibitions to identify suspects, and
179

Guidelines for First Amendment Activities, General Order, SAN
FRANCISCO POLICE DEP’T (8.10 ed., Oct. 1, 2008).
180
Standard Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the San Francisco Police Department §V.B.3 (Mar. 1, 2007)
https://brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/SFPD%20MOUJTTF.pdf.
181
Bridget Fahey, Federalism by Contract, 129 YALE L. J. 2232, 2403-04
(2020); see also San Francisco, Ca., Ordinance 120046 to Establish Policy
Regarding Participation in Federal Counterterrorism Activities (passed by
Board of Supervisors Apr. 3, 120046 (2012).
182
See generally Amsterdam; Davis; and McGowan, supra note 11.
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this rule is made legally enforceable.183 This form of governance makes
the police responsible for making the rules that govern themselves.
But police rulemaking is arguably better classified as selfregulation, when a body makes rules for itself, than as administrative
governance, when a body makes rules that apply to third parties.184
Police rulemaking has been critiqued for a variety of downsides: a
desire to avoid legal liability might water down rules, potential
noncompliance, its undemocratic nature, and problems getting the
police to participate in such a program, to name a few.185 Indeed, recent
studies of police-made rules in the surveillance context highlight the
rarity of police rulemaking, even absent a regime for its legal
enforcement: just seventeen of the total fifty-three agencies in
Massachusetts that used ALPRs developed written policies regarding
their use in 2013.186 Perhaps the deepest problem with police
rulemaking is that self-regulation involves substantial legitimacy and
independence problems, problems that do not accompany the kind of
administrative governance examined by this paper.187 Vesting the
ability to make and enforce rules in one actor raises serious concerns
about concentration of power.188
That said, this previous generation of scholarship deserves a brief
look, given that its motivation and goals were much the same as this
Article’s project. Police rulemaking scholarship emerged in the 1970s
in response to a concern about a lack of gradation in Fourth
Amendment law—either police were required to get a warrant, or not—
and the racially biased patterns that emerged from police discretion in
the non-warrant space.189 Scholars argued that a “wide range of
procedural alternatives below the constitutional level” could achieve
fairer and more accurate convictions.190

183

McGowan, supra note 11, at 665-66.
See Ponomarenko, supra note 14, at 5.
185
Id. at 15-20.
186
Id. at 31 (citing Shawn Musgrave, License Plate-Reading Devices Fuel
Privacy Debate, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 9, 2013).
187
Id. at 20-21.
188
Ronald Allen, The Police and Substantive Rulemaking: Reconciling
Principle and Expediency, 125 PENN. L. REV. 62, 101 (1976).
189
See generally Amsterdam, supra note 11; Davis, supra note 11; McGowan,
supra note 11; Allen, supra note 188; “The Police,” The Challenge of Crime
in a Free Society, PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 91, 103-04 (1967).
190
McGowan, supra note 11, at 689.
184
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These scholars’ chosen vehicle for procedural alternatives was
legally enforceable police rulemaking. Under this proposal, police
would create more granular rules to govern their own conduct, rules
that would be subject to subsequent judicial review.191 This rulemaking
would serve as “a needed check on arbitrariness in the conduct of
various searches and seizures that presently occupy a troubling fourth
amendment limbo,” so-called administrative searches exempted by
courts from the warrant requirement, including border searches,
vehicle stops, searches of impounded vehicles, mail inspections, and
licensing inspections.192 Rulemaking allows clarity and flexibility
“without the cost of amorphousness” that, these scholars argue, arises
from courts applying broad constitutional doctrines to ever-more
specific factual scenarios, often deferring to post-hoc “local
judgements that have either not been made responsibly or not been
made at all” except according to one officer’s discretion.193 Despite the
flaws of self-regulation, this scholarship built a base on which future
work regarding ex ante local governance of criminal procedure would
emerge, including the work of the scholars whose arguments are
highlighted in the next subsection.
B. Arguments for Local Administrative Governance
Administrative governance allows for a more holistic and granular
review of law enforcement practices, an opportunity to better
incorporate technically complex and rapidly changing information, and
an opportunity for a more iterative and interactive form of oversight.194
Although most scholarship advocating for administrative governance
of law enforcement has focused on the federal government, this body
of work’s assessment of the benefits and drawbacks of administrative
governance is still largely applicable to the local context. The below
191
See generally Amsterdam; Davis; and McGowan, supra note 11; “The
Police,” Challenge, supra note 189; but see Allen, supra note 188, at 87-98
(Allen viewed the application of administrative principles to the police as a
fundamental misunderstanding of what the police did: they enforce, not create,
law and rules. Although other administrative lawmaking generally takes place
within the confines of specific expertise, police deal with the entire range of
criminal conduct. Allen also raised separation of powers concerns, given that
the power to make and enforce rules in our system is not usually given to one
actor; similarly, legislatures may not be able to explicitly delegate rulemaking
to police forces, depending on how nondelegation doctrines are interpreted at
the state level.)
192
Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 418.
193
Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 418-19.
194
Renan, supra note 3, at 1076.
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analysis also draws on the few works written about administrative
governance at the local level, mostly with regards to police conduct.195
1. Programmatic Scope
Administrative processes provide an opportunity to discuss
questions that are important but difficult to incorporate into traditional
judicial Fourth Amendment analysis. For each new potential
surveillance technology acquisition, administrative mechanisms
facilitate timely discussion of the more unorthodox risks of advanced
surveillance technologies, risks that are often a poor fit with the
structure of adversarial, procedural judicial proceedings. Specifically,
administrative mechanisms are suited to considering the risks to
communities at large, not just individuals. Indeed, many current local
administrative surveillance governance schemes already do so.196
In addition, this decision-making structure would also allow for
consideration of public cybersecurity risks—how certain technologies
used for specific investigations can make everyone’s devices less
safe—in ways that do not fit into a cabined Fourth Amendment
inquiry.197 This kind of structure could also accommodate discussions
of First Amendment risks of surveillance, as demonstrated by the San
Francisco example above.198
Furthermore, judicial adjudication struggles to limit police
mission creep. In contrast, administrative governance provides a
structured environment for sanctioning or banning a range of possible
use cases ahead of time, which can limit mission creep. This
environment can also help avoid, or at least put in place procedures for
responding to, mistakes down the line. Discussion of these issues does
not mean that the results will be favorable to those who prioritize civil
liberties—indeed, these city bodies may well decide to proceed with
certain police technologies despite the discussed risks—but at least the
debate would happen in a timely and public manner.

195

See generally Ponomarenko, supra note 14; Erik Luna, Principled
Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515 (2001).
196
See discussion of Seattle below.
197
For example, mobile forensics devices that rely on software
vulnerabilities can only be used as long as those vulnerabilities persist, but
fixing the vulnerabilities would make everyone’s phone safer.
198
See generally Katherine Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a
Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49
BOS. COL. L. REV. 741 (2008).
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2. Adaptability
Administrative procedures also allow for a high adaptability to
changing circumstances. While courts offer limited avenues for
changing settled doctrine, administrative procedures allow an option
for adjustment each time a new technology is acquired and throughout
the lifespan of a particular technology, at will. Addressing these
questions does not depend on a defendant’s willingness to or defense
attorney’s diligence in bringing a challenge. Administrative
governance accomplishes this in part by forcing both the oversight
providers and the overseen to the table at the same time, providing an
information-forcing function that courts sometimes lack.199
Last, compared to legislative alternatives and court-only
oversight, administrative governance can easily encompass a broad
cross-section of technologies. Technologies with certain features, like
high visibility, are more likely to capture the attention of a legislature.
By contrast, less salient technologies can still be covered by broader,
technology-neutral administrative policies.
3. Public-Private Regulation
The ability to place some constraints on public-private contracts
is one of the main benefits of this kind of administrative control over
police technology. As discussed earlier, courts have hesitated to force
disclosure of evidence in court in violation of NDAs—and may not
even be aware of an NDA’s existence. Setting out conditions for
public-private contracting as part of the administrative approval
process provides the opportunity to regulate this relationship to
whatever degree the city deems appropriate. City bodies are arguably
more experienced than courts in municipal contracting, which may
make them more knowledgeable actors on this topic, too. To the
contrary, however, their close relationships with industry could leave
them vulnerable to interest capture.200
4. Timeliness
Requiring administrative approval for acquisition of a certain
technology accelerates the debate about risks and rewards, moving it
up in time from a judicial determination. Indeed, from initial debate to
199

For instance, courts have struggled to specify what level of technical detail
warrants must include. The administrative governance approach could
feasibly address this problem at the front end.
200
Andrew Crespo, Systemic Facts: Towards Institutional Awareness in
Criminal Courts, 129 H. L. REV. 2049, 2064 (2016); see infra Part II.C.
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adoption, most of these ordinances took two years, as detailed below,
compared to the ten years it often takes for judicial reconciliation of
these issues. More specifically, administrative oversight offers the
ability to have a technology-neutral framework readily in place to
handle new investigative technologies as they arise, rather than waiting
for a crisis to prompt new rules. Courts are notoriously slow to respond
to technological changes, as discussed earlier in the paper. Even
legislatures lag behind— see, for example, the seven-year gap between
the decision in Smith v. Maryland and the enactment of ECPA—nor do
legislatures regularly update statutes once passed.201 Legislatures are
also sometimes hesitant to act before the courts do.202 On timing,
administrative governance seems to come out ahead. However, the two
models of local administrative governance of surveillance that we have
seen emerge—council plus administrative body versus council-only—
vary in their efficiency. In some places, adding an administrative body
seems to speed up the governance process of surveillance tools; in
others, adding an administrative body slows processes down. Cities
would be wise to consider their own local context and historical track
record when deciding which of the two models to implement to attain
the best efficiency.
C. Worries Regarding Local Administrative Governance
Local administrative governance is not without its flaws. This
section begins by isolating drawbacks of this proposal that are shared
with other governance mechanisms and proceeds to analyze limitations
that are particularly pronounced in this proposal. Andrew Crespo has
critiqued proposals for administrative governance in the criminal law
realm as failing to “examine closely what might be lost in the bathwater
of institutional redesign.”203 Still, he frames institutional reform as a
question of tradeoffs; I argue the tradeoffs favor administrative
governance.

201

Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s
Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 765-66,
769-70 (2005).
202
Mayer, supra note 11, at 653; see also Dow Chem. Co. v. U.S., By &
Through Gorsuch, 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (no Congressional action followed the decision in
Dow Chemical Co., but the Supreme Court essentially reversed Dow Chemical
Co. later in Kyllo).
203
Crespo, supra note 200, at 2060.
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1. Limitations Shared with Other Solutions
a.

Expertise

Neither judges nor legislators nor municipal officials will be
experts on investigative technology. Each of these institutions has
mechanisms, of varying effectiveness, for countering lack of expertise.
Administrative oversight does not solve this problem, but its
mechanisms for addressing the problem offer some advantages.
Courts access outside expertise largely through what the parties
submit to the court. The information submitted depends, then, on the
sophistication of the parties, or on invited amici. Courts also have what
could be called an expertise bias towards property law views of the
Fourth Amendment; other institutions may be more flexible in
addressing search and seizure technologies.204 Legislatures, in theory,
have the ability to consult a wide range of experts, resulting in more
nuanced, clear, and balanced rules with respect to privacy and safety.205
As anyone who studies the legislative process knows, however, the
ability to consult experts does not always result in a reality of experts
consulted.
Compared to federal administrative bodies, local administrative
bodies are not as well-resourced, potentially hindering their ability to
maintain or consult experts. For instance, some standalone local
agencies may only be staffed by part-time members, who also hold
other jobs.206 Administrative forums, though, are less procedurally
constrained than courts in the ways in which they receive and weigh
information, and could conceivably gather a wide range of expertise
themselves and invite in outside experts when making decisions. As
evident in the local processes examined below, two groups with
differing expertise, the police and civil liberties organizations, were
able to participate in public processes informing local administrative
governance. Additionally, in localities that follow the council plus
administrative body model, appointees to the administrative body
could potentially be selected for their particular expertise.

204

Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 81526 (2004).
205
Id. at 806.
206
Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 608
(2017).
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b. Interest Capture
Consulting experts can, however, bleed into interest capture.
Critics argue that administrative governance is just as much at risk of
interest capture or prioritizing executive branch priorities over other
perspectives. Specifically, administrative actors generally share law
enforcement’s aims of law, order, and safety.207 Furthermore, law
enforcement actors will have incentives to argue against specific rules,
regardless of the forum in which the rules are promulgated.208 Police
unions already spend millions in lobbying city council members in
major cities; this lobbying could easily extend to administrative
appointees.209
These are real concerns. At the same time, administrative-style
governance has features that could make administrative actors less
deferential to police perspectives than courts. Local administrative
bodies, whether independent commissions or carried out through
existing councils, are allowed to hear a range of perspectives. In
contrast, in most cases, a court hears from the defense and from the
state. This broader exposure helps encourage decisions that respond to
a range of viewpoints. In addition, repeat player dynamics in
administrative settings differ from those in judicial settings. City
councils and agencies perform a wide range of duties in which law
enforcement is not always their counterpart, increasing the range of
repeat actors to which the council is accountable. For independent
police commissions, concerns about interest capture may be more
similar to a judicial setting. But, compared to a judicial setting in which
the police are repeat players and the other party a one-time defendant,
administrative bodies allow repeat players on both sides, which reduces
the advantage available to police actors to capture the relevant
process.210
207

Crespo, supra note 200, at 2061; see also Slobogin, supra note 4, at 176164 (arguing police have incentives to argue against more specific rules).
208
Slobogin, supra note 4, at 1761-64 (arguing police have incentives to argue
against more specific rules).
209
Tom Perkins, Revealed: Police Unions Spend Millions to Influence Policy
in Biggest US Cities, THE GUARDIAN (June 23, 2020, 06:15:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/23/police-unions-spendingpolicy-reform-chicago-new-york-la.
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Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51,
53-56 (1977), in Patrick Luff, Captured Legislatures and Public-Interest
Courts, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 519, n.126 (2013) (situations in which only one
party has an interest in future cases will mean that party will exert pressure for
their favored outcome).
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My study of initial local governance efforts shows some evidence
that these administrative processes are resistant to interest capture.
First, none of the proposals adopted exactly mirror the “gold standard”
put forward by the ACLU, suggesting that civil liberties interests did
not bulldoze the process. Police interests also did not dominate the
overall process: especially in cities that have revised or reformed their
initial processes, the procedures explicitly expanded to include
stakeholders that could balance law enforcement perspectives.211 That
said, in cities where efforts to implement administrative governance
failed early on, police opposition was almost always evident.212
Clearly, fourteen instances of this kind of governance provide the basis
for only a limited analysis, but early results show some resilience to
interest capture.
2. Unique Limitations of Administrative Control
a. Motivation Limitations: A Response to
Federalism Concerns?
Struggles over federal versus local control of police resources
served as the catalyst for many cities that have implemented
administrative control of investigative technologies. Specifically, the
one trigger of these debates was police departments accepting federal
grant money without local government assent.213 Questions exist about
whether local governments will have the incentives to continue to
develop administrative governance strategies absent such federalism
conflicts.
This pattern is born out in the cities analyzed below. Ten of the
fourteen local entities specifically mention the need to seek approval
before soliciting or accepting federal funding for surveillance
technologies, a feature the ACLU model bill included. Somerville,
Berkeley, and New York do not, but federal acquisitions may be
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See especially details of Seattle’s reform process below.
See Lily Liu and Mailyn Fidler, Four Obstacles to Local Surveillance
Ordinances, LAWFARE (forthcoming Sept. 2020).
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covered by other, broader provisions in the rules.214 Madison carves out
a separate, less rigorous review process for federal acquisitions.215
This federalism motivation may have been sufficient but not
necessary to the development of local administrative governance on
this issue. Other sources of pressure, including local activism,
definitely played roles in some of the case studies below. The passage
of Madison and New York’s laws in the wake of Black Lives Matter
protests over George Floyd’s murder demonstrate this influence.216 As
more cities adopt these kinds of measures, more data will be available
to analyze their motivations.
b. Democratic Legitimacy
Critics argue that administrative governance does not provide the
democratic legitimacy that needs to undergird decisions about
policing.217 Critics also argue that, despite the public-facing parts of
administrative decision-making, these processes are not necessarily
easily accessible, or accepted, by marginalized community members
on whom the burden of such policing decisions falls.218 These critics
argue that the adversarial judiciary the only government institution that
guarantees a voice for marginalized actors in the form of state-provided
representation.219
214

Somerville, for instance, requires council approval for any technology
acquired “without the exchange of monies or other consideration” which
would include federal grant programs. Somerville, Mass., Ordinance 201920 (Oct. 10, 2019) at §10-65(a).
215
Madison, Wis., Ordinance 20-00056 (Enactment date: June 20, 2020)
(“Creating Section 23.63 of the Madison General Ordinances to establish
Surveillance Technology guidelines for Departments”),
https://madison.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4318039&GUID=D
BDE2725-BD49-4062-8C51-A69F5349C520&FullText=1.
216
Nathan Sheard, Victory! New York’s City Council Passes the POST Act,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 18, 2020),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/06/victory-new-yorks-city-councilpasses-post-act.
217
Friedman and Ponomarenko, supra note 4; Mayer, supra note 11, at 64647 (noting that this view is evident in judicial opinions, including: In Re Askin,
47 F.3d 100 (4th Cir. 1995) (Wilkinson, J.); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d
421, 438 (4th Cir. 2016) (Wilkinson, J., concurring); Dalia v. United States,
441 U.S. 238 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct.
2473 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring)).
218
Crespo, supra note 200, at 2062-63; Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of
Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 812 (2012).
219
Sklansky, supra note 170, at 227 (“Judicial hearings are by their nature
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Administrative
governance
certainly
provides
more
220
accountability than police-led rulemaking. More importantly, the
kind of hybrid legislative-administrative governance examined here
offers underexplored benefits by combining existing systems of
democratic representation with the staid values of administrative
governance. In both council-led and council plus administrative body
models, the council retains final authority. In addition to built-in
electoral accountability, councils are well-suited to conducting publicfacing hearings as part of the administrative governance process,
adding to their ability to engage the public. Majoritarian pressure,
interest group capture, and underlying concerns about local electoral
fairness still could come into play.221 But this hybrid model has been
underexplored in existing administrative law literature.222 Pursuing it
further could open new possibilities regarding the democratic
legitimacy of administrative governance.
One additional trend suggests cities might be cognizant of which
decisions regarding surveillance require greater democratic legitimacy
and which can satisfactorily be executed by administrative bodies. For
instance, cities generally have passed legislative bans on facial
recognition technology, rather than leaving such decisions to
administrative oversight bodies, even when those bodies are already
established.223 This initial trend might suggest that cities turn to
legislative avenues when banning, rather than regulating, surveillance
technologies. This allocation of roles could work quite well, taking
advantage of each body’s relative strengths and weaknesses.
c. Administrative Default
In a similar vein, agencies lack the forcing function present in
courts: courts must address the facts that are brought in front of them.
Critics argue that, as a result, administrative bodies may dodge the most
important questions, a problem Andrew Crespo deems “administrative

adversarial, though, which assures at least some representation for both sides,
whereas legislative hearings on privacy issues in criminal investigations can
easily be dominated by law enforcement interests.”).
220
Ponomarenko, supra note 14, at 56-57.
221
Crespo, supra note 200, at 2063; see also Sklansky, supra note 170, at 227.
222
Ponomarenko, for instance, argues for independent third-party bodies as
administrative regulators of the police, which do not necessarily carry with
them the democratic advantages of elected city councils. See Ponomarenko,
supra note 14, at 5.
223
For example, San Francisco, Oakland, Berkeley, and Somerville all turned
to legislatively-enacted ordinances to ban facial recognition technology.
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default.”224 Berkeley’s surveillance governance process very nearly
entered administrative default in its first review of a new acquisition,
CycloMedia software, but legislative pressure helped stave off that
result, yet another potential upside of the close blending of legislative
and administrative functions of local governments.225 So, yes,
administrative default is a real risk—but courts also engage in
question-dodging; they are not a better alternative on this front. We saw
this repeatedly throughout the examples in all of Part I of this paper.
Courts will often resolve cases on non-constitutional grounds, such as
upholding the validity of an NDA that keeps certain evidence out of
court, rather than tackling a thorny Fourth Amendment question.
d. Political Will & Downregulation
Administrative governance will only be as strong as communities
are willing to make it. In the author’s view, this is the most worrisome
feature of local administrative governance of these issues. Relying on
local administrative governance for a gradated Fourth Amendment
could result in no action at all, or in the downregulation of protections.
Developing more gradations of search and seizure procedures has
many benefits, but police will likely try to obtain the lowest standard
possible in many cases. If administrative processes allow subconstitutional benchmarks, police will gravitate towards these, moving
debates away from warrant requirements towards a much less
protective standard. On the other hand, police are already often arguing
for sub-constitutional protections in their arguments that certain actions
do not constitute searches or require warrants. This reason is at the
heart of the benefits of an administrative solution: providing more
limits and measured ways of applying sub-constitutional protections
could bring regularity and oversight to practices that are already
happening on the ground. Administrative governance would regulate
reality rather than wishful thinking.
D. Judicial Review of Local Administrative Governance
Legal challenges to local administrative surveillance governance
could fall into two broad categories. Local governance could be
challenged on substantive legal grounds—for instance, local rules do
not provide satisfactory constitutional protection. Or, they could be
challenged on the basis of improper exercise of authority, with state
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Crespo, supra note 200, at 2064; Friedman and Ponomarenko, supra note
4, at 1863.
225
See infra note 330.
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rules preempting local rules or local entities lacking the authority to
promulgate such rules.
On the substantive point, this Article’s proposal of local
administrative governance envisions such rules as built on top of a
constitutional floor.226 Courts will remain the final arbiter of Fourth
Amendment issues: administrative guidelines should not automatically
be entitled to a presumption of constitutional reasonableness.227
Retaining a central role for the courts in reviewing administrative
guidelines is key to addressing concerns about downregulation through
administrative governance. Administrative governance presents an
earlier-in-time opportunity for non-constitutional, but still substantive,
decision making on Fourth Amendment issues.228
How much deference courts should extend to local rules on
surveillance technologies, on constitutional and non-constitutional
questions, deserves further discussion. Friedman and Ponomarenko
argue for judicial deference towards democratically-authorized rules
about search and seizure, unless a clear constitutional doubt exists,
largely as an incentive for localities to enact such rules.229 As they point
out, however, the Supreme Court has generally chosen not to predicate
the type of deference a rule receives on prior legislative
authorization.230 So far, localities have been choosing to enact
226

See Wayne A. Logan, Fourth Amendment Localism, 93 IND. L. J. 370
(2018) (making this argument in full).
227
City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) (provides support for the
perspective that judicial assessments of reasonableness trump statutory
considerations, but the opinion is narrow and has been criticized for its lack of
specificity and clarity); see, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices are Long on Words
but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010). For broader discussions
of the intersection between administrative/statutory protections and
reasonableness inquiries, see Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling
Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 267-70 (2011); Renan,
supra note 3, at 1079-82.
228
Other scholars have proposed new roles for the court as a way to introduce
or incentivize earlier-in-time decision-making opportunities. See Friedman
and Ponomarenko, supra note 4, at 1891 (arguing courts should use varied
incentives to prompt police rulemaking); See also Jaros, supra note 123, at
1165 (arguing for state court adoption of preemption doctrines to regulate
police); John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103
CAL. L. REV. 205 (2015) (arguing courts should use constitutional
pronouncements to incentivize police rulemaking).
229
Friedman and Ponomarenko, supra note 4, at 1897-98.
230
Id. at 1898 (discussing United States v. Robinson and Gustafson v. Floridaa pair of cases involving similar circumstances where one police department
had a prior policy authorizing the conduct in question).
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governance of surveillance technologies without the need for any
deference incentive incentive. Indeed, I am concerned about the
potential downregulation effects of offering this incentive widely: such
an incentive could reduce the seriousness with which cities design and
implement rules, when the deference “reward” is the real aim.
That said, in cities where administrative governance is carried out
by a separate administrative agency, administrative law standards of
deference along the lines of Chevron, etc., would be applicable.231
However, in a growing and recent trend, a number of states have
enacted legislation prohibiting judicial deference to state agency
interpretation of state legislation, and such opposition to deference may
extend to the local level.232 At the local level, deference on substantive
questions seems unwise, and on interpretive questions, out of vogue.
Courts will also address legal challenges on the basis of improper
exercise of authority and preemption with respect to local
administrative surveillance governance. Regarding questions of local
authority, the standard of review that courts use is an important
threshold question. This standard will depend on the model of
administrative governance a city has implemented. If a city has
implemented a council plus administrative body model, the actions
could be reviewed under principles of administrative law.
Administrative law at the local level does exist.233 Courts assess issues

231
William Eskridge and Lauren Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 Geo. L. J. 1083, 1092 (2008).
232
Arkansas (2020), Wisconsin (2018), Florida (2018), Mississippi (2018),
Arizona (2018), and Michigan (2008). See State Responses to Judicial
Deference (Administrative State), BALLOTPEDIA (June 2020),
https://ballotpedia.org/State_responses_to_judicial_deference.
233
Davidson, supra note 206, at 605; for lengthier discussion of state APAs,
see Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common
Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1207 (2015); see also Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism:
State Administrative Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REV.
551 (2001).
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of nondelegation from councils to local agencies,234 procedural
irregularities,235 and grapple with issues of deference.236
However, cities that have adopted a council plus administrative
body model generally limit the administrative body to a supervisory
role; that is, the body reviews policies drafted by city agencies seeking
to use surveillance tools rather than drafting the policies itself. This
type of administrative function is not typically what we think of when
we consider administrative governance—the kind accompanied by
notice and comment rulemaking. But it is nonetheless reviewable
administrative action. Federal agencies perform this kind of
certification process, too; take, for example, the EPA’s registration
process for pesticides, which is essentially a review process. The EPA’s
registration decisions can still be challenged on APA grounds, for
reasons such as failure to publicize or failure to base the decision on
sufficient evidence.237 The local administrative bodies in action could
be challenged on similar grounds under local and state administrative
law.238
Additionally, where citizens think too much power has been ceded
to such administrative bodies, or improperly ceded, state and local
nondelegation doctrine, much more robust than the moribund federal
equivalent, can be used as a basis for challenge, too.239 Scholars have
234

See Davidson, supra note 206, at 620-621 (discussion of nondelegation
issues in the New York soda portion size debate); see also Paul A. Diller,
Local Health Agencies, the Bloomberg Soda Rule, and the Ghost of Woodrow
Wilson, 40 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1859, 1868-77 (2013).
235
A handful of cities have their own administrative procedure acts, including
one city included in this Article, Seattle. These acts often contain some form
of notice and comment rulemaking requirements. See Casey Adams, Home
Rules: The Case for Local Administrative Procedure, 87 FORDHAM L. REV.
629, 654 (2018).
236
See Davidson, supra note 206, at 620-21; see also Diller, supra note 204,
at 1877-78, 1897; see also Aaron Saiger, Chevron and Deference in State
Administrative Law, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 555, 558-60 (2014) (discussion of
deference at the state level).
237
See, e.g., Ellis v. Bradbury, No. C-13-1266 MMC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
54339 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2014); see also NRDC v. United States EPA, 857
F.3d 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2017).
238
See Grant’s Farm Assocs. Inc. v. Town of Kittery, 799 A.2d 799 (Me. 1989)
(concluding local board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence);
Kosalka v. Town of Georgetown, 752 A.2d 183, 187 (Me. 2000) (striking
down instructions to administrative board as providing insufficient guidance).
239
Davidson, supra note 206, at 622; Josh Eagle, The Practical Effects of
Delegation: Agencies and the Zoning of Public Lands and Seas, 35 PEPP. L.
REV. 4, 835, 836-7 n.3 (2008).
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pointed to the nondelegation doctrine’s robustness at the local level as
a potential backstop against local interest capture.240 Widespread
uptake of this kind of governance of surveillance tools, by expanding
the areas in which local administrative law matters, could spur further
legal development in the local administrative law field.
Most localities have, however, so far implemented city-council
led administrative-style governance of local surveillance technologies;
potentially due to the resource-intensive nature of setting up a separate
administrative body. This architectural choice takes these decisions out
of the realm of administrative law and into judicial review of proper
use of municipal power. The precise standard of judicial review would
turn on the legal status of a municipality within a state—whether the
city operates under a type of home rule or under the more restrictive
“Dillon’s Rule.” In both of these contexts, however, judicial review of
local council actions would be limited to an up/down approval on the
basis of whether the locality has the authority to regulate in the area.241
Some states allow cities to operate under home rule, which,
coarsely put, allows localities to make rules in any area where the state
did not explicitly bar or preempt them.242 Many variations of home rule
exist. At the extreme end lies constitutional home rule (often called
imperium in imperio, empire within an empire), where local matters are
generally immune to preemption as a constitutional matter.243 These
localities would have wide latitude to institute surveillance governance
without state preemption challenges. A middle ground version of home
rule assesses legislative intent and examines the particular domain of
local regulation when deciding issues of preemption.244 The softest
form of home rule, statutory or legislative home rule, grants local
governments full home rule powers until the state legislature explicitly
restricts a particular power.245
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Davidson, supra note 206, at 624.
See generally Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review in Local Government Law:
A Reappraisal, 60 MINN. L. REV. 669 (1976).
242
David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1507 n.37 (2010) (citing RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, 332-36
(7th ed. 2008)).
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Lynn Baker and Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and
Judicial Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337 (2009).
244
Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 2 – Remedying the Urban
Disadvantage Through Federalism and Localism, 77 LA. L. REV. 1045 (2017).
245
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I – The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1990).
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Other states operate under “Dillon’s Rule,” which requires
explicit or necessarily implied grants of authority to localities.246 Dillon
cities may have trouble claiming that they have received grants of
specific authority to regulate surveillance technologies, rather than a
more general authority to regulate the police.247 For Dillon cities,
technology-neutral regulation offers an additional legal benefit: by
framing surveillance rules as procedural rules governing the police,
rather than rules governing specific technologies, cities may be better
able to place these rules within the high-water marks of municipal
power. Similarly, technology-neutral regulations are more likely to fall
outside of state law preemption: states tend to regulate specific
technologies and are unlikely to enact broad-reaching regulations of
police forces.248
In either context, this authority-based standard of review seems to
miss many of the important questions raised in the standards of review
seen in administrative law, even at the local level. The kinds of rules
made by city councils in this Article’s proposal seem ripe for rational
basis review or arbitrary-and-capricious analysis. This argument that
administrative law should be incorporated into judicial review of
municipal action has been made in other literature.249 This Article’s
proposal—administrative-style governance executed by a city
council—strengthens arguments for incorporating administrative law
principles into judicial review of local action so that these actions are
246

Aaron Saiger, Local Government as a Choice of Agency Forum, 77 OHIO
ST. L. J. 424, 443 (2016).
247
Among the five states in which cities have implemented rules, the split is
relatively even between Dillon’s rule and home rule states. Washington,
California, and Tennessee apply some version of Dillon’s rule, while Ohio and
Massachusetts adhere to home rule. See Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., Meghan Z.
Gough and Robert Puentes, Is Home Rule the Answer? Clarifying the
Influence of Dillon’s Rule on Growth Management, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 1,
INSTITUTION (2003); see also Jon D. Russell and Aaron Bostrom, Federalism,
Dillon Rule, and Home Rule, AM. CITY EXCH. EXCHANGE (2016), available).
248
For a study of technology-specific state preemption of local privacy laws,
see Ira Rubinstein, Federal and State Preemption of Local Privacy
Regulation, N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW, PUB. LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 18-17
(2018); see Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22
J.L. & POL. 1, 17–27 (2006) (for discussion of clear statement rules required
for state preemption).
249
Aaron Saiger, supra note 246, at 446; see also Gerald E. Frug, The City as
a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1062-67 (Apr. 1980); Paul A. Diller,
Local Health Agencies, the Bloomberg Soda Rule, and the Ghost of Woodrow
Wilson, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1859, 1863-65 (2013); Bruff, supra note 241,
at 211.
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reviewed for quality, not just authority. That said, this kind of drastic
change in the standard of review of local action is unlikely. A more
modest proposal might suggest submitting only specific decisions
made pursuant to an ordinance to administrative review, while
retaining up/down review of the ordinances themselves.
E. Federal and State Alternatives
There are two alternatives those who object to administrative
governance might still suggest as solutions: federal administrative
control of local police practices or state legislative control. These
options do have attractive qualities, but are nonetheless not as viable as
a local administrative governance approach.
1. Federal Control
Federal regulation of local police is an idea that is appealing to
many—after all, for those inclined to favor administrative governance,
federal administrative agencies are much more well developed than
local ones.250 Federal agencies would also be a streamlined solution,
rather than relying on each locality to implement their own system.
Jonathan Mayer suggested considering whether “certain hacking tools
should be reserved for federal law enforcement,” perhaps so limited by
DOJ administrative rulemaking.251 Rachel Harmon argues that “the
federal government plays an ineliminable role in addressing the
problem posed by the police.”252 She calls on more detailed
Congressional regulation of policing, and points to (limited) conduct,
remedies, training, employment, and transparency statutory regulations
as evidence that the federal government can play such a role.253
Indeed, Congress appears ready to explore new federal regulations on
police forces in the light of the murder of George Floyd.254 But, as
Harmon herself points out, its ability to do so is circumscribed.255
Under the constitution, the federal government has limited ability to
regulate law enforcement within states, which is considered a power

250

See generally Harmon, supra note 218, at 814-16 (for scholars favorably
discussing federal administrative regulation of police); Renan, supra note 3,
Part IV-V.
251
Mayer, supra note 11, at 580 n.29.
252
Harmon, supra note 218, at 814.
253
Id.
254
See generally, e.g., George Floyd Justice in Policing Act 2020, H.R. 7120,
116th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2020).
255
Harmon, supra note 218, at 815.
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reserved to the states in the Tenth Amendment.256 Some of these
“partway” solutions would do a great deal of good—take, for instance,
an administrative rule at the federal level requiring federal agencies to
seek local political approval before disbursing grant money for new
technologies.257 That said, partway is the furthest we’d get with a topdown federal approach, given the limitations imposed by the federal
system. Granularity, responsiveness, timeliness, and scope would all
be challenges with top-down federal regulation.
2. Legislative Control
Some scholars have called for greater legislative action on police
practices.258 These proposals do have a historical basis; during the
1970s and 1980s, Orin Kerr notes that, “Congress rather than the courts
has shown the most serious interest in protecting privacy from new
technologies.”259 This congressional interest has waned for the

256

Jared P. Cole, Federal Power over Local Law Enforcement Reform: Legal
Issues, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE (2016); Nathan James and Ben Harrington,
What Role Might the Federal Government Play in Law Enforcement Reform?
CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE (2018); Ponomarenko, supra note 14, at 60.
257
Indeed, already, when federal actors “use cell-site simulators in support of
other Federal agencies and/or State and Local law enforcement agencies,”
U.S. Dep’t of Just. guidance applies; see U.S. Dep’t of Just. Guidance 2015,
supra note 41, at 6.
258
Friedman and Ponomarenko, supra note 4, at 1875-84 (arguing for methods
that preserve democratic participation in police rulemaking); See Erin
Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 485, 534-37 (2013) (showing the benefits and downsides of a legislative
approach to Fourth-Amendment related practices; calls for a measured and
mixed approach but notes many underappreciated benefits of a legislative
approach).
259
Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 855-860 (2004). Of
its own initiative, Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974 (allowing citizens
to check and correct personal information in government databases), the
Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), the Cable
Communications Privacy Act of 1984, the Video Privacy Protection Act of
1988, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, and
the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (not an exhaustive list).
Responding to court decisions, Congress passed the Right to Financial Privacy
Act of 1978 (after United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)), the Privacy
Protection Act of 1980 (after Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 98 S.
Ct. 1970 (1978)), and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(after Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979)).
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technologies included in this paper, however. Little federal
Congressional action on related has happened since the early 2000s.
State legislative activity could, however, provide a more
responsive form of legislative governance.260 Indeed, a few state
legislatures have enacted laws that require local police forces to obtain
permission from local government before accepting federal grants for
surveillance technologies (New Jersey and Montana).261 This kind of
legislative activity on police governance issues is favored primarily for
its democratic accountability, a feature that judicial review does not
provide.262 Supporters of legislative oversight contend that legislative
rules are more comprehensive, balanced, clear, and flexible than judgemade rules, better able to keep pace with technological change, and
more fully informed technologically.263
The primary drawback of legislative governance is, however, not
what it could be, but what it tends to be. Legislative governance relating
to police technology tends to be overly technology specific and
responsive only to technologies that affect a wide swath of the
population.264 Drones, for example, have been the subject of much
legislative action. As of 2017, 26 states have passed laws regulating
government drone use in some way, and 18 of those require warrants
for their use.265 At least 19 states have passed laws regulating use of
drones by non-governmental actors.266 But drones are literally visible
to constituents, could affect a wide swath of the population, not just
defendants, have public and private uses, and are physical, hewing
more closely to traditional American views of property-based privacy.
In contrast, only six states have passed laws regulating police use
of stingray devices, which do not share the same visibility features.267
260

See Ponomarenko, supra note 14, at 61-63.
Sen. 2364, 216th Leg., Regular Sess. (N.J. 2015); H.R. 330, 2015 Leg., 64th
Sess. (Mont. 2015).
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Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE
L. J. 1346, 1391 (2006).
263
Kerr, supra note 259, at 807-08.
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2020) (for a critique of technology-specific local legislative measures).
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This legislative action was not any faster than judicial decisionmaking. The first state bill (California) prohibiting wireless use of
stingray devices did not pass until 2015.268 Legislative initiatives may
not necessarily solve the time-lag problem of judicial decision-making.
Furthermore, drone statutes tend to display one of the key
drawbacks of statutory approaches to police technology: they are
technology-specific.269 Gregory McNeal’s study of state-level drone
statutes finds that most laws are tailored to the technology rather than
to the harm, which means legislatures are delivering piecemeal, rather
than systemic, legislation on surveillance policy.270 Legislatures can
pass statutes tailored to the harms—the New Jersey and Montana laws
discussed directly above are a good example—but they tend not to be.
Perhaps the best model of a state legislative law on California
adopted a law in 2015 that requires local governments to approve
police acquisition of “cellular communications interception
technology” (aka stingray devices) at a public meeting.271 In addition,
the law requires local police to develop a use and privacy policy for the
device and disclose cooperation agreements with other agencies
regarding the use of such tools.272 The law provides a private right of
action, which was just invoked for the first time in 2020 to challenge
the City of Vallejo’s acquisition.273 The law provides robust
Hinders Federal Surveillance Program, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER (May
8, 2020); Mike Maharrey, Signed as Law: New Mexico Strengthens Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER (Mar. 9, 2020);
Mike Maharrey, New Hampshire Law Bans Warrantless Stingray Spying,
TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER (July 13, 2017); AZ Senate Passes Bill
Prohibiting Warrantless Stingray Spying, ARIZONA DAILY INDEPENDENT
(Feb. 28, 2017); Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Cellphones, Law Enforcement,
and the Right to Privacy, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (2018); Mike Maharrey,
Now in Effect: Sweeping Vermont Privacy Law Will Hinder Several Federal
Surveillance Programs, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER (Oct. 1, 2016); Dave
Maass, Success in Sacramento: Four New Laws, One Veto—All Victories for
Privacy and Transparency, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 14, 2015).
268
Maass, supra note 267.
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GEO. WASH. L. REV 354, 360 (2016).
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transparency and democratic approval requirements, in addition to
building an enforcement mechanism. It falls short in only applying to
a limited range of technologies—but all of the structural elements of
the bill reflect best practices being adopted by localities across the
country. A state law inspired by this California effort, written in a
technologically neutral manner and incorporating some of the more
administrative-style requirements seen in local bills, would be a
welcome way to ensure statewide local governance of surveillance
technologies. Unfortunately, at least in California, efforts to pass a bill
that did exactly that in 2017 failed in the California Assembly after
passing the Senate, and such efforts have not been successfully
revived.274 State legislative efforts hold promise but have so far failed
to live up to their potential.
F. Current Local Administrative Governance of Police Tech
As of August 2020, fourteen local government entities—thirteen
cities and one county—have passed laws formalizing administrative
control over police use of sophisticated investigative technologies.275
Based on an analysis of these fourteen policies, each section below
assesses a substantive portion of the ordinances: approval processes for
Equitable Relief Complaint, Oakland Privacy v. City of Vallejo, Cal. Super.
Ct., No. FCS054805 (May 21, 2020).
274
See S.B. 21, 2017 Leg. (Ca. 2017); see Oakland Privacy Timeline,
OAKLAND PRIVACY, https://oaklandprivacy.org/timeline/.
275
See Community Control Over Police Surveillance, ACLU (2020),
https://aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillancetechnologies/community-control-over-police-surveillance. See also infra
Figure 2. For ordinances, see Seattle, WA., Ordinance 124142 (Mar. 18,
2013); Seattle, WA., Ordinance 125376 (July 31, 2017); Santa Clara Co., Cal.,
Ordinance NS-300.897 (June 21, 2016); Nashville, Tenn., Ordinance
BL2017-646 (June 7, 2017); Somerville Exec. Order, Policy on Surveillance
Technology (Oct. 4, 2017); Oakland, Cal., Ordinance Adding Ch. 9.64 to the
Oakland Municipal Code Establishing Rules for the City’s Acquisition and
Use of Surveillance Equipment (Apr. 26, 2018); Palo Alto, Cal., Ordinance
5450 (Oct. 1, 2018); Cambridge, Mass., Ordinance 111918 (Dec. 10, 2018);
Lawrence, Mass., Ordinance 133/2018 (Aug. 21, 2018); Berkeley, Cal.,
Ordinance 7,592-N.S. (Mar. 13, 2018); Davis, Cal.., An Ordinance of the City
Council of the City of Davis Adding Article 26.07 of the Davis Municipal
Code Regarding City Use of Surveillance Technology and Establishing the
Penalty for a Violation Thereof (Mar. 20, 2018); Yellow Springs, Ohio,
Ordinance 2018-47 (Nov. 19, 2018); San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 107-19
(June 4, 2019); Somerville, Mass., Ordinance 2019-20 (Oct. 10, 2019);
Madison, Wis., Ordinance 20-00056 (June 16, 2020); New York, New York,
Law No. 2020/065 (July 15, 2020).
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acquisition and use of technology, limits on contractual arrangements
with private actors, and enforcement mechanisms. All but one of the
ordinances contain approval requirements on acquisition and use.276
Surprisingly, only four ordinances explicitly prohibit non-disclosure
agreements (NDAs) with private entities. Last, nine of the twelve
contain some grant of a private right of action to enforce the ordinance.
Where entities had keyword-searchable records of city council
deliberations, I examined these records to illuminate what drove the
choices and patterns that emerged.
Some credit—or critique—the ACLU as spearheading the
adoption of these kinds of laws. The ACLU has been active in
advocating for this style of governance, and has made a model bill
available to cities.277 The analysis shows, however, that cities did not
take up the ACLU model bill wholesale. Rather, cities made
significant alterations in certain areas, particularly regarding NDAs and
what kind of private right of action to extend.
Procedurally, all but one city passed city council ordinances
updating municipal codes; Santa Clara County followed the same
approach at the county level. The procedural approach only differed in
Somerville, Massachusetts. There, the mayor first passed an executive
order containing provisions similar to the other ordinances in 2017.
Notably, Somerville is a particularly strong-mayor city.278 The city
council followed up two years later with a ban on facial recognition
technology and a comprehensive ordinance in 2019.279

276

New York is the exception and is discussed further below.
Community Control Over Police Surveillance (CCOPS) Model Bill, ACLU
(July 20, 2020).
278
For local coverage of debate about Somerville’s strong-mayor structure,
see, e.g., Jo C. Goode, Councilor Camara Proposes Changing City
Government by Altering Charter, HERALD NEWS (updated May 16, 2017,
4:46 pm), https://www.heraldnews.com/news/20170516/councilor-camaraproposes-changing-city-government-by-altering-charter.
279
Katie Lannan, Somerville Bans Government Use of Facial Recognition
Tech, WBUR (June 28, 2019),
https://www.wbur.org/bostonomix/2019/06/08/sommerville-bansgovernment-use-of-facial-recognition-tech; Thalia Plata, City Officials
Discuss Surveillance Technology Guidelines, THE SOMERVILLE TIMES (Feb.
5, 2020), www.thesomvervilletimes.com/archies/97194; Somerville, Mass.,
Ordinance 2019-20 (Oct. 10, 2019).
277
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1. Passage and Procedures Actors Involved
These ordinances take about two years to pass from start to finish,
significantly faster than judicial convergence and state legislative
action. Typical government actors involved in the development of
these ordinances included the city council and staff, the mayor’s office,
the police department, and various city legal and technology experts.280
In some circumstances, the district attorney or county prosecutor and
the public defender’s office participated.281 External actors typically
included members of the public and local ACLU representatives; in
some areas, civil society participation was broader, including ethnic

280

Rubinstein, supra note 248, at 129; City Manager Submits Surveillance
Technology Documents to City Council and the Public, CITY OF CAMBRIDGE,
Nov. 27, 2019.
281
For Seattle, see Rubinstein, supra note 248, at 126l; for Santa Clara, see
Finance and Government Operations Committee Special Meeting (May 6,
2015, 4:08-4:12 PM); Finance and Government Operations Committee
Regular Meeting (Mar. 12, 2015, 3:50 PM); Finance and Government
Operations Committee Regular Meeting (Oct. 16, 2015, 3:08 PM).
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minority advocacy groups.282 Public comment took place through the
normal channels for public input in each municipality, mainly
involving public comments at the hearing, rather than formal noticeand-comment process. Revisions of ordinances usually involve an
expansion of participants; Seattle’s revision process broadened
participation to include the staff of various city offices as well as
additional public input, and Somerville saw a shift from the mayor’s
office to the city council.283 Where independent police review
commissions pre-date the ordinances, as in Berkeley, they were
sometimes involved in developing ordinances.284 In one of the smaller
municipalities to pass an ordinance, Yellow Springs, Ohio, the measure
appeared to be a smaller concerted effort between a local civil rights
attorney, local ACLU affiliate representatives, and the municipal
solicitor.285
Each ordinance varies slightly in the procedures it requires; as
an overview, I will present the details of one city’s, Oakland’s,
considered a gold standard. Oakland adopted a city council plus
administrative body model. The ordinance allocates some duties to the
city council and some to a separate body called the Privacy Advisory
Commission (PAC).286 The PAC and Council share approval duties for
new acquisitions or new uses of surveillance technologies. A city
agency seeking to acquire or change how it uses a surveillance tool
must notify the PAC of its desire to seek funding or otherwise acquire
the tools.287 The agency must present the PAC with a surveillance
impact report and use policy. The PAC reviews these documents and
votes on a recommendation of how to proceed, which goes to the city
council.288 The city council then must make a final decision at a public
hearing; if approved, the policies are adopted by resolution.289 The
impact report and use policy are also made public. The PAC bears
primary oversight responsibilities for ongoing use of surveillance
282

For example, the Council on Islamic Relations (CAIR) was involved in
developing Berkeley’s ordinance. See DJ Pangburn, Berkeley Mayor: We
Passed the “Strongest” Police Surveillance Law, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 24,
2018).
283
Ira Rubinstein, Privacy Localism, NYU PUBLIC L. & LEGAL THEORY
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES WORKING PAPER NO. 18-18, 2018, at 129.
284
See Pangburn, supra note 282.
285
Megan Bachman, Village Council—Surveillance Policy Passed, YELLOW
SPRINGS NEWS (Nov. 15, 2018).
286
Oakland, Cal., Ordinance 13, 489 (May 15, 2018).
287
Id.
288
Id.
289
Id.
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technologies. Each year, an agency that uses an approved tool must
submit an annual report of its use to the PAC, which can request further
information and make a recommendation to the city council about
whether any changes should be made; such changes would also be
made by resolution. In cities with local surveillance ordinances that
pursue a council-only model, the procedures look very similar, with the
council performing the tasks the administrative body otherwise
would.290
These procedures do not mirror formal notice and comment
rulemaking, as in federal or state administrative law. Still, many of the
same principles animate the procedures. Although no formal
mechanism exists for public comment, public hearings accomplish
some, but not all, of the same aims. In some jurisdictions, these public
meetings are timed early in the process to afford ample time to consider
public feedback; in others, they occur later. Similarly, the impact and
use statements usually must be made public; but again, the timing of
this publication varies.
These procedures differ substantively in one major way from
traditional federal conceptions of administrative governance. Here, the
regulated actors still draft the substantive rules themselves, subject to
administrative and/or council approval. This model is not what we see
at the federal level, where an administrative body makes the
substantive rules for the regulated party, and these rules are not subject
to any additional approval unless challenged in court. Still, these local
procedures are more administrative in nature than they are legislative:
an elected city council is not drafting detailed codes of use for every
new software package that the police department acquires. The
legislature is acting as a check, in its oversight capacity, rather than as
rule-makers.
A discussion of passage would be remiss if it did not include a
reflection on unsuccessful comprehensive ordinances. A review of
failed ordinances suggests very few reach formal stages before being
voted down—that is, when these efforts fail, they fail early. But in one
locality, the city council of Lawrence, Massachusetts overrode a
mayoral veto to pass its comprehensive surveillance governance
scheme.291 In several instances, proposals seemed to fizzle, appearing
multiple times for council review but then disappearing from agendas,
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See, e.g., Yellow Springs ordinance, supra note 275.
Bill Kirk, After Political Scrum, Surveillance Cameras Doing Job, EAGLETRIBUNE (July 28, 2019).
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but such fizzling does not rule out an eventual revival.292 Many failed
ordinances dealt only with surveillance cameras, with some councils
rejecting the bills because they were too stringent and some because
they were not stringent enough.293 That we found many more instances
of failures of single-technology ordinances than of broad surveillance
ordinances may speak to the strength of a more flexible administrative,
regulatory scheme that can change with time.
2. Acquisition and Use
Thirteen of fourteen municipal entities enacted policies that
require approval of acquisition and use of new surveillance
technologies by a city council or similar body.294 Generally, these
provisions require police (and other city agencies) to submit reports
detailing a range of information about the technology they seek to
acquire. This information usually includes: a description of how the
technology works, when and in what contexts it will be used, where it
will be used, and sometimes anticipated effects on vulnerable
communities. In addition, ordinances usually require approval of use
plans that detail, for example, authorized use scenarios, data privacy
292
Particularly, St. Louis, Hartford, and Miami Beach have had proposals
appear multiple times and then drop off agendas. See Lily Liu and Mailyn
Fidler, supra note 212.
293
See Jackson Cote, Springfield City Council Passes Facial Recognition
Moratorium, MASSLIVE (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://www.masslive.com/springfield/2020/02/springfield-city-councilpasses-facial-recognition-moratorium.html (discussing that Springfield’s
threatened mayoral veto was based on the facial recognition technology
being too restrictive); Bera Dunau, Northampton City Council Overrides
Mayor’s Veto, Upholds Camera Ordinance, DAILY HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE
(Jan. 10, 2018, 11:17:41 PM),
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ve
d=2ahUKEwjx8cHvg7DrAhWXvZ4KHYWAgUQFjAHegQICxAG&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gazettenet.com%2Fc
amera-ordinance-14817532&usg=AOvVaw0EEd2-Uh1YG_q5fvvGCOZU
(stating that the mayoral resistance in Northampton seemed to stem from a
concern that the regulation was too specific); Teri Figueroa, City Committee
Rejects Smart Street Lights Surveillance Policy in San Diego, Wants a Law
Instead, SAN DIEGO TRIB. (Jan. 29, 2020) (noting that San Diego rejected a
video surveillance ordinance in 2020 as not comprehensive enough); Ryan J.
Stanton, Video Surveillance Ordinance Falls Short at Ann Arbor City
Council Meeting, ANN ARBOR NEWS (July 2, 2013), (discussing that Ann
Arbor rejected a video surveillance ordinance in 2013 as too restrictive).
294
New York is the only ordinance that does not; it requires annual reporting.
See New York ordinance, supra note 275.
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plans, and mechanisms for internal oversight. Most also require
approval for new uses of existing surveillance technology, as well as
annual reports of instances of use. The bills surveyed did not require
councils to make determinations on whether warrants are required for
newly acquired technologies, an area for growth in terms of these kinds
of ordinances. Ten of the fourteen entities also require federal funding
or loans/gifts of technology to go through the administrative
processes.295 New York is the one city not to require approval of
acquisitions; its ordinance requires publishing use policies and annual
reporting.296 Because of its governance structure, the New York city
council is limited to this kind of transparency-based oversight of the
police.297
3. Varied Approaches to Non-Disclosure Agreements
The local policies vary widely in their approach to non-disclosure
agreements. Although the ACLU model bill included a ban on nondisclosure agreements with private vendors, only four entities
explicitly prohibit NDAs, with one additional city requiring any NDAs
be made public; one additional city requires the disclosure of contracts
with private entities but is silent regarding NDAs.298 The remainder of
ordinances do not specifically address restrictions on NDAs.299 As this
295

Somerville, Berkeley, and New York do not explicitly mention federal
acquisitions, although Somerville does require approval of data sharing with
federal entities. Madison prescribes a less stringent administrative approval
process for such tools. See Somerville ordinance, supra note 275; Berkeley
ordinance, supra note 275; New York ordinance, supra note 275; Madison
ordinance, supra note 275, at 23.63(6).
296
New York ordinance, supra note 275, at §2.
297
Mike Maharrey, New York City Passes Ordinance that Takes First Step
Toward Limiting Surveillance State, TENTH AMEND. CTR. (June 19, 2020).
298
Prohibiting NDAs: Oakland, CA, supra note 275, at §9.64.060; Lawrence,
MA, supra note 275, at §9.25.110; Yellow Springs, OH, supra note 275, at
§607.08; and Seattle, WA, supra note 275, at §14.18.040(C) (allowing
government to share information in response to court orders and effectively
overriding NDAs). Requiring public disclosure of NDAs: Berkeley, CA,
supra note 275, at §2.99.080. Somerville requires disclosure of the existence
of contracts with private entities, but is silent with regards to NDAs.
Somerville, MA, supra note 275, at §1066(b)(9).
299
Containing no restrictions on NDAs: Santa Clara County; Nashville, TN;
Somerville, MA; Palo Alto, CA; Cambridge, MA; Davis, CA; San Francisco,
CA; Madison, WI; NYC. See Santa Clara Co. ordinance, supra note 275;
Nashville ordinance, supra note 275; Somerville Executive Order, supra note
275; Palo Alto ordinance, supra note 275; Cambridge ordinance, supra note
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paper argues—and as the language in the model ACLU bill indicates—
non-disclosure agreements with private vendors restrict availability of
evidence in court and gives rise to many of police surveillance’s
troubling aspects. The variation in inclusion of NDA-related clauses is
surprising and troubling.
What reason might cities have for forgoing this particular feature
of local surveillance governance? Of the local entities with keywordsearchable city council minutes, Santa Clara County and Cambridge
returned results for “non-disclosure agreements,” so the following
analysis is based on limited results. Some of the lack of discussion
could be explained by evolution in best practices over time; bans on
non-disclosure agreements were not included, for instance, in the first
local surveillance ordinance to pass (Seattle’s, in 2013, although
Seattle later added provisions governing private entities). Santa Clara
was only the second entity to pass a surveillance ordinance after
Seattle’s 2013 version. Debates leading up to the Santa Clara
ordinance’s passage did include discussion of the problems with nondisclosure agreements but notably only by public defenders.300 The
idea did not gain much traction with the Board, and remaining debate
centered primarily around enforcement mechanisms. The final
ordinance passed without explicit NDA restrictions.
In Cambridge, explicit non-disclosure language disappeared from
early drafts. Non-disclosure restrictions were present in the initial 2016
draft. This language was subsequently dropped from later drafts and
discussions, with no explanation present in the record. One explanation
could be that the 2016 draft in its entirety was essentially scrapped. But
some aspects of the original document made it into the final version—
just not this one. Perhaps drafters considered NDAs covered by other
sections of the ordinance (i.e. covered under general approval of
contracts) or this feature was overtaken by debates about other aspects
of the ordinance. Still, given the inclusion of NDA restrictions in the
ACLU model bill and the initial 2016 bill, its absence from the debate
and the final version of the bill still strikes me as odd. Interest capture
could have played a role, but the public record does not include
evidence to support that conclusion. The lack of uptake of this
particular feature of surveillance governance, in Cambridge and
275; Davis ordinance, supra note 275; San Francisco ordinance, supra note
275; Madison ordinance, supra note 275; New York ordinance, supra note
275.
300
Spec. Meeting Before the County of Santa Clara Fin. and Gov’t Operations
Comm. (May 6, 2015, 4:08-4:12 PM); Reg. Meeting Before the County of
Santa Clara Fin. and Gov’t Operations Comm. (Mar. 12, 2015, 3:50 PM).
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elsewhere, demonstrates one of the limitations of this kind of
governance: it is only as strong as local will and political dynamics
make it.
4. Enforcement Provisions
Enforcement provisions vary between bills and often were
contentious issues in debates leading up to passage. Cities are clearly
making conscious choices about how enforcement of these ordinances
should work, and, consequently, to whom relevant power runs. One of
the reasons standing and enforcement provisions were so contentious
is that, absent a private right of action or other statutory remedy, courts
have a limited ability to enforce local administrative rules governing
police technology on constitutional grounds. This complication is one
reason advocates pushed so hard for private right of action clauses in
local ordinances at the possible expense of other desired additions.
The ACLU model bill suggests providing citizen standing to sue
for violations of the policy.301 Only Oakland, Cambridge, Somerville,
and Lawrence (MA) provide this broad citizen standing to sue for
violations.302 Santa Clara, Berkeley, Davis, and San Francisco provide
limited citizen standing, and Seattle amended its 2013 ordinance in
2017 to provide limited standing.303 Most of these limited standing
clauses contain some variation of the following: standing for citizens
comes into effect after providing written notice to the local government
and allowing the government a period of, say, 90 days to come into
compliance with the policy. Nashville, Yellow Springs (OH), Madison
(WI), and New York contain no standing provisions, and Palo Alto
explicitly prohibits a private right of action.304
Standing provisions were usually the most debated element of
these ordinances. Santa Clara passed its ordinance over objection from
the county counsel about its enforcement language; ACLU
301

ACLU, supra note 174.
See, e.g., Cambridge ordinance, supra note 275, at §2.128.080(B) (“Any
person injured by a violation of this Chapter may institute proceedings for
injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or a court order in a court of competent
jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of this Chapter.”).
303
Santa Clara County ordinance, supra note 275, at §A40-10; Berkeley
ordinance, supra note 275, §2.99.080; Davis ordinance, supra note 275, at
§26.07.070; San Francisco ordinance, supra note 275, §19B.8; Seattle
ordinance (2017), supra note 275, at §14.18.070.
304
Nashville ordinance, supra note 275; Somerville Executive Order, supra
note 275; Yellow Springs ordinance, supra note 275; Madison ordinance,
supra note 275; New York ordinance, supra note 275; Palo Alto ordinance,
supra note 275, at 2.30.690.
302
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representatives at Santa Clara meetings also repeatedly stressed
enforcement, forgoing the opportunity to press for other inclusions.305
Similarly, Cambridge’s standing provisions were subject to fraught
debate and went through many iterations. The first version of the bill
contained language granting citizen standing, but this language was
soon dropped. Instead, other early versions of the bill rested all
oversight authority in the City Manager, garnering criticism.306 Public
pushback led to the Public Safety Committee, the relevant city
committee, to recommend to the full council that citizen standing be
included in the ordinance.307 In response, the draft ordinance included
a provision granting limited citizen standing: citizens could bring suit
after giving notice to the City Clerk within 30 days of the violation, and
after allowing a further 90 days for the city to remedy the situation.308
Ultimately, after further debate, the City Manager suggested a revision
striking the standing limitations from the bill.309 The council adopted
this language, producing an ordinance providing for broad citizen
standing—back where the draft started.
The ACLU model bill also contained language that made
violations of surveillance ordinances a misdemeanor for government
employees. No local entity makes any violation a misdemeanor, but
Santa Clara and Davis make intentional wrongful violations a
misdemeanor; San Francisco struck this provision at the last reading
and provided no alternate employment sanctions.310 Oakland,
Lawrence (MA), and Yellow Springs (OH) enact employment

305

Reg. Meeting Before the County of Santa Clara Fin. and Gov’t Operations
Comm. (Mar. 12, 2015, at 3:22-3:24 PM); Spec. Meeting Before the County of
Santa Clara Fin. and Gov’t Operations Comm. (May 6, 2015, at 3:02 PM);
Reg. Meeting Before the County of; Santa Clara Fin. and Gov’t Operations
Comm. (Dec. 10, 2015, at 2:46 PM).
306
Cambridge City Council Public Minutes, Draft, at 197 (Nov. 21, 2016);
Cambridge City Council Agenda Packet, Crockford Comments, at 122 (May
14, 2018).
307
Craig Kelley, Objectives of a Successful City Surveillance Ordinance, Jan.
8, 2017, included in Cambridge City Council Final Action Packet, at 325 (Jan.
22, 2018).
308
Cambridge City Council Public Minutes, Redline Version, at 102 (Dec.10,
2018).
309
Cambridge City Council Public Minutes, City Manager Proposed
Revisions, at 41, 54 (Nov. 26, 2018).
310
Santa Clara County ordinance, supra note 275, at §A40-12; Davis
ordinance, supra note 275, at §26.07.070(c); San Francisco ordinance, supra
note 275, §19B.8(b) (struck).
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consequences for employees who violate the policy.311 Seattle,
Nashville, Somerville, Palo Alto, Madison, and Berkeley contain no
employee-specific consequences.312 Again, these provisions were
frequently debated. In Santa Clara, the county counsel objected on
multiple occasions to the inclusion of the misdemeanor provision.313 In
Oakland, government representatives pushed back against all of the
included enforcement measures.314 Although standing remained in the
final Oakland bill, the council removed the misdemeanor offense from
the language and replaced it with employment consequences.315
5. Updating Local Administrative Governance
Many of the first local attempts at administrative governance of
police technology have fallen short of the ideal on a few counts.
Primarily, the repeated failure to use local governance to challenge
NDA clauses is disappointing, given that the ability to do so is one of
this mechanism’s strengths. Private sector bargaining power and the
intricacies of local procurement may have won out. Similarly, few
localities actually included specific warrant requirements for classes of
technology, although the case-by-case approval process may still
reserve that ability for cities. Although many ended up including
enforcement provisions, their effectiveness remains to be seen.
Still, local administrative governance is built to be updated in
response to new information and implementation shortcomings in a
way that is distinctly different from courts or legislative rules.
Administrative governance is supposed to change over time to best
conform to the broad goals it serves. And we can see the particular
virtue of the administrative approach at work in Somerville,
Massachusetts and Seattle already.
Somerville enacted an executive order regarding surveillance
technologies in 2017.316 The city council passed a ban on facial
311
Oakland ordinance, supra note 275, at §9.64.050(D); Lawrence ordinance,
supra note 275, at 9.25.100(B); Yellow Springs ordinance, supra note 275, at
§607.10.
312
Seattle ordinance, supra note 275; Nashville ordinance, supra note 275;
Somerville Executive Order, supra note 275; Palo Alto ordinance, supra note
275; Madison ordinance, supra note 275; Berkeley ordinance, supra note 275.
313
Reg. Meeting Before the County of Santa Clara Fin. and Gov’t Operations
Comm. (Feb. 11, 2016); Reg. Meeting Before the County of Santa Clara Bd.
of Supervisors (June 7, 2016, at 9:32 AM).
314
Oakland City Council Minutes (Mar. 22, 2018).
315
Oakland ordinance, supra note 275, at §9.64.050.
316
See Somerville Exec. Order, supra note 275.
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recognition technology in 2019.317 In the wake of this bill’s passage,
the council also passed a council-led ordinance regulating surveillance
technologies.318 What began as a mayoral initiative seems to be
transforming into a more robust and democratic governance system in
Somerville.
The reforms have been more dramatic in Seattle. Seattle, the
earliest city to enact this kind of governance in 2013, made fairly
substantial updates to its initial set of rules in 2017. Seattle’s 2013
ordinance lacked enforcement provisions and turned out to contain an
under inclusive definition of surveillance technology focused on
hardware, to the exclusion of software.319 It also contained a wide
exception for temporary police use of surveillance technologies
without council approval, allowing their use in such cases on the basis
of reasonable suspicion, not a warrant.320 A 2016 scandal, in which the
Seattle police acquired the social media monitoring software Geofeedia
without informing any of the parties required by city law, exposed the
2013 ordinance’s weaknesses.321 The 2013 version did, however,
contain a provision for subsequent review of the ordinance’s
effectiveness.322
Instead of abandoning its effort, or resigning itself to subpar
enforcement, the City updated the ordinance in 2017 and 2018. The
updates added limited citizen standing as an enforcement measure,
annual review requirements, and wider community engagement
provisions.323 Seattle also added language that placed some restrictions
on private parties, although not going so far as to ban non-disclosure
agreements. Seattle now has at least 29 technologies undergoing
317

See Lannan, supra note 279.
See Plata, supra note 279.
319
Melissa Hellmann, Seattle’s Oversight of Surveillance Technology is
Moving Forward Slowly, SEATTLE TIMES (June 4, 2019).
320
Phil Mocek, Seattle City Council Pass Ordinance Restricting Surveillance
Equipment After Councilmember Harrell Slips in a Gift for Police,
MOCEK.ORG (Mar. 19, 2013), https://mocek.org/blog/2013/03/19/seattlepasses-ordinance-restricting-surveillance-after-harrell-slips-in-gift-forpolice/.
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Ansel Herz, How the Seattle Police Secretly—and Illegally—Purchased a
Tool for Tracking Your Social Media Posts, THE STRANGER (Sept. 28, 2016),
https://www.thestranger.com/news/2016/09/28/24585899/how-the-seattlepolice-secretlyand-illegallypurchased-a-tool-for-tracking-your-social-mediaposts.
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Seattle ordinance (2013), supra note 275.
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Seattle ordinance (2017), supra note 275, at §14.18.070, §14.18.060,
§14.18.050.
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review.324 Critics counter that the updated version is too unwieldy,
requiring review processes of six months or more plus an additional
review by a community stakeholder committee, and still does not
address data sharing between government agencies.325 Indeed, some of
these measures may be an overcorrection.
This example shows that local administrative governance is not
perfect—but it is built to be flexible and responsive to achieve its goals.
Within the span of a few years, local administrative governance can be
updated to address not only new technologies and new use cases, but
also limitations in its own design. This adaptability is where local
administrative governance really shines in comparison to court
decision-making and even legislative rules.
6. Local Surveillance Governance in Action
Local surveillance ordinances have not been an empty letter. The
procedures have worked, allowing municipalities to adopt use and
privacy policies alongside new or existing surveillance technologies.
Oakland, considered a leader on these issues, approved use and privacy
policies for three technologies, stingray devices, Shotspotter (a gunshot
detection system), and automated license plate readers (ALPRs).326
Each of these technologies went through the entire required
administrative processes before being voted on by the city council. The
police have delivered, as required, annual reports on stingray device
use, the earliest technology approved, in every year since approval.327
Davis adopted use and privacy policies for the technologies its police
department already had in use prior to adoption of the surveillance
ordinance—body cameras, parking enforcement ALPRs, and
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Omar Daza-Quiroz and Bruce Stoffmacher, Cellular Site Simulator – 2018
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Cellebrite forensics devices.328 Under its new use policy, officers must
obtain a warrant to use Cellebrite technologies.329
In at least both Oakland and Berkeley, the processes established
by the surveillance ordinances stopped adoption (or unapproved
adoption of certain surveillance technologies or practices. In Berkeley,
the City Manager tried to acquire CycloMedia technology, which takes
panoramic snapshots of city streets, outside of the procedures required
by the city’s surveillance ordinance.330 The mayor and several city
councilors opposed this effort and were successful in rerouting the
acquisition through the procedures required by the surveillance
ordinance, which includes requiring drafting a use policy prior to
deployment.331
Oakland’s Privacy Advocacy Commission, which serves as the
body that reviews use and privacy policies, also pushed back on several
occasions. Prior to 2017, the Privacy Advocacy Commission had
recommended to the Council that the City sever ties between the
Oakland Police Department and Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement.332 In 2017, the City Council passed an ordinance
expanding the Privacy Advocacy Commission’s oversight role to city
participation or cooperation with federal surveillance operations.333
Subsequently, in 2019, the Commission rejected the annual
surveillance report pertaining to federal cooperation as insufficiently
transparent.334 Here, the City chose to expand the remit of the local
administrative agency in response to advocacy from that agency itself,
which resulted in pushback against the federal government.
Taking a different strategy, the Commission recommended in
2019 that the City amend its surveillance ordinance to permanently ban
facial recognition technology; the City did so in the summer of 2019.335
328
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Instead of relying purely on administrative oversight to control the
risks of this particular technology, the agency and the council together
decided to pursue an essentially legislative strategy, a Council-led ban
on the technology. Here, rather than expand administrative capacity,
both bodies worked to affect a legislative solution; perhaps the actors
desired the greater democratic accountability that such a solution
would bring to a complete ban.
Local administrative governance of surveillance has not been
without difficulties, however. Berkeley’s consideration of surveillance
device use policies has experienced extensive delays. The surveillance
ordinance passed in 2018, and as of March 2020, only one policy (for
body cameras) had received proper review by the City Council; review
of a policy for ALPRs was still pending.336 The smallest municipality
to pass an ordinance—Yellow Springs, Ohio, population
approximately 3,700—does not appear to have acquired any additional
surveillance equipment since passage of its ordinance, based on a lack
of responsive documents in a search of city council records since the
adoption. However, a chance exists that the city did, and the acquisition
did not go through the appropriate processes. These two scenarios
demonstrate the real risk of administrative default in local
administrative governance. The intertwined nature of the legislative
and administrative functions of local governments may here be a
blessing: as in the Berkeley CycloMedia acquisition example,
sometimes local legislative pressure can help the administrative
processes function properly.
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CONCLUSION
Police adoption of new investigative technologies will continue.
We need a process that can handle the introduction of new technologies
as they arise, not just in response to abuses. We need a process that can
run even without the resources it takes to mount a public vote on
allowing or banning a new investigative technology. Local
administrative governance offers this kind of solution. Importantly, it
offers fine-grained control in a setting that is able to take a wide range
of interests into consideration and can respond to altered
circumstances.
Local administrative governance does not solve the question of
political will as it relates to police technology. If a polity does not want
to regulate police technology, local administrative governance does not
surmount that hurdle. But, it does offer a path of less resistance towards
governance. Getting an existing city council to take on a new portfolio
takes work, but fewer people need to be convinced in order for it to
happen, compared to a legislative response.
This approach, like any, will not solve all problems related to
police technology. Still, it offers distinct advantages over the current
status quo, and those advantages are bearing out in early adopter cities.
Oakland’s Privacy Commission, for instance, has successfully received
annual disclosures of police use of stingray devices.337 In contrast, to
get that data from Baltimore requires lengthy Freedom of Information
337
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Request battles.338 In 2017, Oakland used its stingray devices three
times, all for homicide investigations.339 In 2014, Baltimore logged
over 30 pages of stingray device uses, only about 14 percent of which
related to homicides.340 Many differences between the two cities exist,
but this anecdote offers hope that local administrative governance of
investigative technology offers a way to use the governance
infrastructure we have as a control valve for the investigative
technologies our police want.

338

Baltimore Police Dep’t, supra note 122.
Babka and Birch, supra note 327.
340
Baltimore Police Dep’t, supra note 122.
339

